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The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering 
Corporate Criminal Prosecution 
David M. Uhlmann* 
Corporate crime continues to occur at an alarming rate, yet 
disagreement persists among scholars and practitioners about the role of 
corporate criminal prosecution. Some argue that corporations should face 
criminal prosecution for their misconduct, while others would reserve 
criminal prosecution for individual corporate officials. Perhaps as a result 
of this conflict, there has been a dramatic increase over the last decade in 
the use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements for some 
corporate crimes, even as the government continues to bring criminal 
charges for other corporate crimes. To move beyond our erratic approach 
to corporate crime, we need a better understanding of what is 
accomplished by the criminal prosecution of corporations, a construct that 
considers retributive and utilitarian theories but also takes into account 
the expressive function of criminal law and the societal need for 
condemnation, accountability, and justice when crime occurs. 
In this article, I provide a justification for corporate criminal 
prosecution that identifies the moral content of corporate crime, considers 
the deterrent value of corporate prosecution, and explains why the 
expressive value of the criminal law is indispensable in the corporate 
context. Corporate wrongdoing has pernicious effects on our communities, 
the economy, and the environment, which warrant the condemnation the 
criminal law provides. Criminal prosecution of corporations upholds the 
rule of law, validates the choices of law-abiding companies, and promotes 
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accountability. Together those values contribute to our sense that justice 
has been done when crime occurs, which enhances trust in the legal 
system, provides the opportunity for societal catharsis, and allows us to 
move forward in the aftermath of criminal activity. When corporations 
face no consequences for their criminal behavior, we minimize their 
lawlessness, and increase cynicism about the outsized influence of 
corporations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For more than a decade, the Justice Department morphed its 
approach to corporate crime, eschewing criminal prosecutions in favor 
of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements that allowed 
large corporations to avoid the ignominy of criminal convictions.1 The 
trend began during the Bush administration and became so dominant 
during the Obama administration that the Criminal Division of the 
Justice Department entered deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements in more than two-thirds of the corporate cases it resolved 
between 2010 and 2012.2 There seemingly were no crimes that did not 
qualify for corporate absolution. The Justice Department entered a 
non-prosecution agreement in the Upper Big Branch mine disaster that 
killed twenty-nine miners, even though the Labor Department found 
that the mine owner had committed over 300 egregious violations of 
federal mine safety laws.3 The Justice Department agreed to a deferred 
prosecution with HSBC, even though the bank was involved in nearly 
a trillion dollars of money laundering, much of it from drug 
trafficking.4 There were no prosecutions at all — deferred or otherwise 
— for the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, even 
though financial institutions and officials within those companies took 
unnecessary risks and engaged in conduct that imperiled the global 
economy.5 
 
 1 In a deferred prosecution agreement, criminal charges are filed but eventually 
dismissed if the corporation complies with the terms of the agreement; in a non
prosecution agreement, criminal charges are never even filed if the company meets its 
obligations under the agreement. David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non
Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 
1295, 1301 n.43 (2013) [hereinafter Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability]. 
 2 It is difficult to overstate the surge in deferred and non prosecution agreements 
and the shift away from criminal prosecution of corporations. From 1992 to 2004, the 
Justice Department entered 26 deferred and non prosecution agreements, an average 
of just over two per year. From 2004 to 2012, the Department entered 242 deferred 
and non prosecution agreements, an average of just over 30 per year. Between 2010 
and 2012, the Criminal Division entered twice as many deferred prosecution and non
prosecution agreements as plea agreements. David M. Uhlmann, Op Ed., Prosecution 
Deferred, Justice Denied, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2013, at A23. 
 3 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1 at 1295 300; 
David M. Uhlmann, Op Ed., For 29 Dead Miners, No Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2011, 
at A25 [hereinafter 29 Dead Miners]. 
 4 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1 at 1337 38. 
 5 See, e.g., Sewall Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 26, 2011, at A1 (describing the events leading up to the financial crash and the 
subsequent reports issued after a federal inquiry); Crash Course: The Origins of the 
Financial Crisis, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/ 
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Then, with public alarm increasing over the lack of criminal 
prosecutions for the financial crisis,6 the pendulum swung, and 
criminal prosecutions were back in vogue. In 2014, the Justice 
Department brought record-setting criminal prosecutions against the 
European banks Credit Suisse and BNP Paribas for currency 
manipulation.7 Similar prosecutions followed during 2015 against JP 
Morgan Chase and Citicorp — apparently no longer “too big to jail” 
— as well as Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, and UBS.8 Volkswagen 
will likely face criminal charges for using defeat devices to conceal 
motor vehicle emissions violations, even though Toyota Motor 
Company and General Motors received deferred prosecutions for 
concealing motor vehicle safety violations during 2014 and 2015.9 
To be fair, some parts of the Justice Department never stopped 
prosecuting corporate crime. The Environment and Natural Resources 
Division, historically the source of the largest number of corporate 
 
schoolsbrief/21584534 effects financial crisis are still being felt five years article 
(discussing generally the history of the financial crisis). See generally THE FIN. CRISIS 
INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011), available at 
http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/report (outlining the findings of the commission created to 
examine the financial crisis).  
 6 See Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High Level Executives Been 
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/ 
archives/2014/jan/09/financial crisis why no executive prosecutions/. See also Court 
E. Golumbic & Albert D. Lichy, The “Too Big to Jail” Effect and the Impact on the Justice 
Department’s Corporate Charging Policy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 101, 123 26 (2014) 
(observing that, in aftermath of financial crisis, Justice Department has been under 
pressure to address wrongdoing at financial institutions amidst public perception that 
criminal conduct caused crisis); Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 265, 278 80 (2014) (noting demand for criminal prosecutions and 
recognizing that they may have value but not as a substitute for regulatory reform to 
prevent similar financial crises in the future).  
 7 Ben Protess & Jessica Silver Greenberg, Big Swiss Bank Pleads Guilty in Felony 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2014, at A1; Ben Protess & Jessica Silver Greenberg, BNP 
Admits Guilt and Agrees to Pay $8.9 Billion Fine to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2014, at B1. 
 8 Michael Corkery & Ben Protess, Banks Admit Scheme to Rig Currency Price, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 21, 2015, at A1. 
 9 Compare Del Quentin Wilber & Greg Farrell, Volkswagen Said Focus of U.S. 
Criminal Probe on Emissions, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 21, 2015, 5:16 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015 09 21/volkswagen said to be target of
u s criminal probe on emissions, with Bill Vlasic & Matt Apuzzo, Toyota Is Fined $1.2 
Billion for Concealing Safety Defects, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2014, at B1, and Danielle 
Ivory & Bill Vlasic, $900 Million Penalty for G.M.’s Deadly Defect Leaves Many Cold, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2015, at B1. For a critique of the GM deferred prosecution 
agreement, see David M. Uhlmann, Op Ed., Justice Falls Short in G.M. Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2015, at SR5. 
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prosecutions,10 entered only two deferred prosecutions in the 
seventeen years between 1993 and 2009; the Antitrust Division, the 
source of the third largest amount of corporate prosecutions, entered 
only three deferred prosecutions during the same timeframe.11 Still, 
the Criminal Division employs the largest number of prosecutors in 
the Justice Department and is responsible for its most high-profile 
matters. Ambivalence within the Criminal Division about whether 
corporations should be prosecuted for their crimes — across two 
ideologically disparate administrations — suggests uncertainty about 
the role of corporate criminal prosecution. 
The legal basis for imposing criminal liability on corporations is 
well-settled. Corporations are criminally liable for the acts of their 
employees or agents, committed within the scope of the employment 
or agency, for the benefit of the corporation.12 The corporation must 
act with the mental state required by the statute in question, which 
involves imputing the mental state of individual employees or agents 
to the corporation.13 In cases where no corporate employee or agent 
possesses the requisite mental state, however, criminal liability may be 
imposed based on the collective knowledge of the corporate 
employees or agents.14 It is not a defense for a corporation to argue 
that the conduct was not authorized by the board or officers of the 
corporation.15 Nor is it a defense to argue that the conduct was 
prohibited by official policies of the corporation or even the express 
instructions of supervisors.16 
 
 10 Environmental crimes historically are the subject matter of the largest number 
of corporate prosecutions. See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 
97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1873 (2011) [hereinafter Globalized Corporate Prosecutions]. 
 11 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 1318 19 
(citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CORPORATE CRIME 15 nn.29 & 35 (2009)). 
 12 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909). 
New York Central requires the first two elements: (1) acts of employees or agents; and 
(2) committed within the scope of the employment or agency. Subsequent decisions 
have added for the benefit of the corporation as a way of ensuring that the conduct is 
within the scope of the employment or agency. See, e.g., United States v. Potter, 463 
F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2006). The employee or agent acts for the benefit of the 
corporation even if the employee or agent acts for her own benefit, as long as the 
employee or agent acts at least in part to benefit the corporation. United States v. 
Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 13 United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing 
Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719, 722 (5th Cir. 1964)). 
 14 Id. at 856. 
 15 United States v. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972) (citations 
omitted). 
 16 Id. 
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What then explains the conflicted approach to criminal prosecution 
of corporations — and what does it reveal about the theoretical basis 
for corporate criminal liability? A cynical response would be that the 
revolving door between Criminal Division leadership and white-collar 
law firms leads to a lack of resolve about the need to prosecute 
corporations.17 Perhaps there is greater willingness among career 
prosecutors to prosecute corporations, but my sense is that the 
political leadership of the Justice Department is faithful to its law 
enforcement mission and wants to bring high-profile cases when the 
law and the facts allow. A more nuanced view is that the Justice 
Department’s erratic approach reflects a lack of agreement among 
practitioners about what is accomplished by the criminal prosecution 
of corporations, a disagreement that also exists in scholarly accounts 
of corporate criminal liability focusing on retributive and utilitarian 
purposes of punishment.18 
Critics of corporate prosecution argue that there is no retributive 
purpose served by criminal punishment of corporations. They assert 
that criminal prosecution should be reserved for individuals, since 
corporate entities have no moral capacity.19 In addition, they claim 
that prosecuting corporations punishes shareholders and employees 
who had no role in the wrongdoing.20 From a utilitarian perspective, 
the critique focuses on the fact that the sanctions for corporate 
misconduct — monetary penalties and structural reforms — are the 
same regardless of whether the punishment occurs as the result of 
 
 17 See, e.g., Ben Protess, Once More Through the Revolving Door for Justice’s Breuer, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2013, at B6.  
 18 See infra Part I. 
 19 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 
319, 320 (1996) (“Corporations are legal fictions, and legal fictions cannot commit 
criminal acts. Nor can they possess mens rea, a guilty state of mind. Only people can 
act and only people can have a guilty state of mind.”). This view is not so settled 
among moral philosophers. See generally Business Ethics: 2.1 Is the Corporation a Moral 
Agent?, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Apr. 16, 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
entries/ethics business/#CorMorAge (describing debate over whether corporations are 
moral actors independent of individuals that comprise the corporation). 
 20 Fischel & Sykes, supra note 19 at 349 (“[I]n the case of a corporation, the 
burden of a punitive award will fall primarily on the shareholders, most of whom 
usually have no connection to the wrongdoing in question.”); see also Albert W. 
Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1359, 1367 69 (2009) [hereinafter Two Ways] (“The penalties imposed on 
innocent shareholders and employees when corporations are convicted are not 
incidental, collateral, or secondary. They are what the punishment of a collective 
entity is all about.”). 
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criminal or civil enforcement.21 This deterrence-based argument gains 
credence based on economic analysis suggesting that criminal 
enforcement may be less effective in promoting future compliance 
efforts, because companies are not incentivized to disclose and address 
wrongdoing if criminal prosecution (as opposed to civil enforcement) 
might ensue.22 
Supporters of corporate prosecution argue that criminal 
enforcement is an essential tool to promote compliance with the law.23 
They insist that there is a retributive role for corporate punishment, 
since wrongdoing in the corporate context deserves censure just as 
much as it does where individual conduct is involved.24 Moreover, 
when the corporation benefits from the misconduct, it cheats against 
its competitors; corporate misconduct therefore should be considered 
blameworthy in a moral and retributive sense. From a utilitarian 
perspective, advocates of corporate prosecution concede that the 
sanctions may be similar but assert that the deterrent effect of criminal 
punishment is necessarily greater than civil punishment, both because 
of the reputational harm imposed by criminal prosecution and the 
collateral consequences that may result from a criminal conviction.25 
My view is that both corporations and individuals must be held 
accountable when misconduct occurs in the corporate setting.26 From 
a practical standpoint, corporate wrongdoing has a pernicious effect 
that warrants the use of all available tools to address it. The notion 
that criminal and civil sanctions are indistinguishable is belied by my 
experience as a federal prosecutor, including seven years as the Chief 
 
 21 See, e.g., V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 
109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1534 (1996) (“[S]ome justification for corporate criminal 
liability may have existed in the past, when civil enforcement techniques were not 
well developed, but from a deterrence perspective, very little now supports the 
continued imposition of criminal rather than civil liability on corporations.”). 
 22 See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 866 67 (1994). 
 23 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1482 86 (2009) (arguing that “[b]ecause of their size, 
complexity, and control of vast resources, corporations have the ability to engage in 
misconduct that dwarfs” that of individuals, such that corporations must also be held 
accountable). 
 24 See id. at 1485. 
 25 See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. 
L.J. 473, 500 03 (2006) [hereinafter Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability] 
(examining what deterrence for entities may result from reputational harm); 
Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 1335 (explaining 
what collateral consequences may result from criminal prosecution).  
 26 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 1295 96.  
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of the Justice Department’s Environmental Crimes Section, when 
corporate officials and their attorneys uniformly insisted that they 
would prefer civil enforcement to criminal prosecution.27 From a 
theoretical perspective, there are both retributive and utilitarian 
justifications for corporate criminal punishment. I would suggest that 
corporations are moral actors, with the capacity to act intentionally 
and to do good or evil, despite the fact that they do not have 
consciences, beliefs, or desires like individuals.28 I also assert that 
there is additional deterrent value associated with criminal charges 
against corporations. Companies do not want to be labeled corporate 
criminals and therefore may have more incentives to avoid criminal 
sanctions than otherwise comparable civil or administrative 
sanctions.29 
Yet the focus on retributive and utilitarian justifications — both in 
practice and in academia — obscures the expressive function of the 
criminal law and the societal need for condemnation, accountability, 
and justice when crime occurs. As Joel Feinberg explained with regard 
to the prosecution of individuals,30 an essential role of the criminal law 
is to make clear what conduct is outside the bounds of acceptable 
behavior and to express societal condemnation of unlawful conduct.31 
The criminal law imposes blame and provides accountability for illegal 
behavior.32 The criminal law also validates the choices made by those 
who comply with the law by imposing punishment upon those who 
break the law. When criminal violations occur but are ignored or 
addressed by non-criminal alternatives, we obscure the line that the 
 
 27 As Chief of the Environmental Crimes Section, I was responsible for approving 
all charging decisions in cases prosecuted by my office, including hundreds of cases 
involving charges against corporations. 
 28 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 1333 34; see 
Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 833, 846 51 (2000) (examining how unique viewpoints, attitudes and moral 
judgments are attributed to corporations). 
 29 I acknowledge that corporate officials may be most incentivized to comply with 
the law by the prospect that they could go to jail if they engage in wrongdoing. David 
M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental Crime, and the 
Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1443 (2011) [hereinafter After the Spill] 
(explaining that the possibility of incarceration is more likely to result in corporation’s 
compliance). 
 30 Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397 (1965).  
 31 See John L. Diamond, The Crisis in the Ideology of Crime, 31 IND. L. REV. 291, 
311 (1998) [hereinafter Crisis in the Ideology of Crime]. 
 32 See generally Buell, Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, supra note 25, 
at 492 94 (showing how individuals blame and hold entities accountable for their 
illegal actions). 
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criminal law draws between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. 
When we do not condemn criminal behavior in the strongest possible 
terms, we risk minimizing or, worse, condoning lawlessness.33 
The expressive function of the criminal law plays an even more 
essential role in the corporate context. First, we confer significant 
benefits on corporations with the expectation — indeed, the mandate 
— that corporations exist for legal purposes alone. When a corporation 
exploits those benefits and violates the public trust by engaging in 
illegal conduct, we must make clear that its behavior is unacceptable 
and condemn its conduct as criminal. Second, corporations have 
outsized power and influence in our society. When a corporation abuses 
that power and influence by committing crimes, we must impose blame, 
require accountability, and insist upon acceptance of responsibility. 
Third, corporations can neither be jailed nor have their individual 
liberties restricted when they commit crimes. The distinctive feature of 
corporate criminal prosecution is its ability to label corporate 
lawlessness as criminal, which is qualitatively different than labeling 
misconduct as a civil or administrative violation and critical to assuring 
society that corporate criminals are brought to justice. 
In this Article, I will offer a more complete account of corporate 
criminal liability that incorporates retributive and utilitarian purposes, 
while emphasizing the expressive function of the criminal law and the 
broader societal values served by corporate criminal prosecution. Part 
I will consider the critiques of corporate criminal liability from both 
retributive and utilitarian perspectives. I will argue that there are 
retributive and utilitarian justifications for corporate criminal liability, 
even if those accounts may be incomplete. Part II will explain why the 
expressive function of criminal liability, whether viewed as a 
standalone proposition or an expansion of retributive and utilitarian 
theories, is essential to our understanding of the justification for 
corporate criminal liability and punishment. I will suggest that the 
expressive value of criminal prosecution — and the societal catharsis 
that results — is the most indispensable quality of corporate 
prosecution. Part III will address the relationship between the 
prosecution of corporations and individuals, with a focus on 
corporate-only prosecutions, which some view as a failure of 
prosecutorial discretion. Those criticisms are misplaced. Far from 
undermining arguments for corporate criminal liability, “corporate 
 
 33 Dan Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 598 
(1996) [hereinafter Alternative Sanctions]. 
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only” resolutions demonstrate why corporate prosecution plays a 
critical role in our criminal justice system. 
I. CRITIQUES OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 
Criminal law theorists focus on retributive and utilitarian 
justifications for the imposition of punishment. Retributive theory 
focuses on the moral content or wrongfulness of criminal behavior 
and justifies punishment based on the “just deserts” of the 
defendant.34 As Michael Moore explains, “Retributivism is the view 
that punishment is justified by the moral culpability of those who 
receive it. A retributivist punishes because, and only because, the 
offender deserves it.”35 Utilitarian theory focuses on the societal harm 
of criminal behavior and justifies punishment to the extent that it 
serves the greater good (i.e. provides societal benefits that exceed the 
harm to the defendant).36 A utilitarian punishes to promote 
compliance with the law and deter future wrongdoing by the 
defendant (specific deterrence) and others who might violate the law 
absent the consequences they would face for engaging in similar 
misconduct (general deterrence).37 
The focus of retributive and utilitarian theory is the punishment of 
individuals, specifically how as an ethical matter society can justify the 
loss of life or liberty that may accompany criminal punishment. It 
therefore is not a surprise that neither theory provides a complete 
justification for corporate criminal liability; retributive and utilitarian 
theories were not developed with corporations in mind. Neither loss of 
life or liberty is at stake when companies are charged criminally, 
although the latter may be implicated when corporate officials are 
charged.38 Nonetheless, critics of corporate criminal liability rely on 
retributive and utilitarian theories to support their claims. 
 
 34 Id. at 593 (“The purpose of imprisonment . . . is to make offenders suffer. The 
threat of such discomfort is intended to deter criminality, and the imposition of it to 
afford a criminal his just deserts.”).  
 35 Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, 
AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 
1987) (italics omitted). 
 36 See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 70 (2005) 
(describing the purposes and limitations of the utilitarian approach to punishment). 
 37 See id. at 70 72. 
 38 Non criminal alternatives are often justified by concerns about collateral 
consequences for employees, shareholders, and customers. Claims that criminal 
prosecution could result in a “corporate death penalty” have been debunked, however, 
since companies almost never fail as a result of criminal prosecution. Gabriel H. 
Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate 
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In this Part, I will assess the critiques of corporate criminal 
prosecution. Analytical fit issues aside, I will suggest that the critiques 
miss their mark: there are retributive and utilitarian purposes served 
by corporate criminal liability, even if a more complete justification for 
corporate criminal liability requires accounting for the expressive 
function of criminal punishment, which I will address in Part II. 
A. The Retributive Critique of Corporate Criminal Liability 
John Coffee’s seminal article “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An 
Unscandalized Inquiry Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment 39 is 
often cited by critics who argue that corporations should not be 
prosecuted criminally because they are not moral actors deserving of 
punishment.40 Like many critics of corporate criminal liability, 
Professor Coffee worried that corporate penalties would largely be 
visited upon innocent third parties, including stockholders, 
bondholders, employees who were not involved in the misconduct, 
and even customers.41 He also focused extensively on the limits of 
corporate criminal liability, arguing that prosecution of corporations 
might not deter misconduct by individual employees42 and describing 
the “deterrence trap” that results because corporations cannot be 
 
Criminal Convictions in the Twenty First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 797, 827 (2013) 
(“No public company convicted in the years 2001 2010 went out of business because 
of a federal criminal conviction. This result calls the conventional wisdom about the 
Andersen Effect into serious doubt.”). 
 39 John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized 
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981). 
 40 Examples of this critique include the following: Albert W. Alschuler, Ancient 
Law and the Punishment of Corporations: Of Frankpledge and Deodand, 71 B.U. L. REV. 
307, 311 12 (1991) (“[E]fforts to stigmatize aggregations of people, most of whom are 
blameless, are unjustified in principle . . . .”); Buell, Blaming Function of Entity 
Criminal Liability, supra note 25, at 475 (“Criminal law scholars have doubted the 
doctrine’s theoretical soundness, pointing to illogic in retribution toward objects and 
the impossibility of fitting liberal concepts about responsibility with nonhuman 
actors. Entity criminal liability, these arguments go, is a purely imputed form of fault 
that has little or nothing to do with blameworthiness. And the doctrine is concerned 
with the fault of something without free will or character  that is, an apparition with 
‘no soul to be damned and no body to be kicked.’”); Khanna, supra note 21, at 1479
80 (“[L]egal thinkers did not believe corporations could possess the moral 
blameworthiness necessary to commit crimes of intent.”); John T. Byam, Comment, 
The Economic Inefficiency of Corporate Criminal Liability, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
582, 583 85 (1982) (arguing that retributive theory is inapplicable in corporate 
context because corporations cannot be morally blameworthy). 
 41 Coffee, supra note 39, at 401 02. 
 42 Id. at 393. 
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jailed and may not have sufficient capitalization to be deterred by 
monetary penalties.43 
Significantly, however, Professor Coffee did not claim that 
corporations should not be prosecuted. Instead, as I do, Professor 
Coffee argued that prosecutors should focus both on corporations and 
their employees when confronting criminal behavior in the corporate 
setting. Coffee explained that “a dual focus on the firm and the 
individual is necessary. Neither can be safely ignored.”44 His concern 
was that a focus on corporate prosecution, without also pursuing 
charges against individuals, would not be sufficient to deter criminal 
activity in the corporate setting, and he advocated for the use of 
alternative corporate sanctions that might provide more effective 
deterrence to corporate actors than pure monetary penalties.45 
Nonetheless, even if Professor Coffee were most concerned with the 
limitations of corporate criminal liability as a deterrent for 
wrongdoing, the retributive critique of corporate liability is well 
summarized by his “no soul to damn, no body to kick” moniker. If the 
purpose of criminal punishment is to impose sanctions based on the 
defendant’s moral culpability, corporations only would be proper 
targets of criminal prosecution if they possess moral capacity. 
Corporations are persons under the law, which allows them to sue and 
be sued and permits the law to treat their conduct as criminal.46 But 
corporate personhood is a legal fiction: corporations are artificial, 
incorporeal persons with no “minds” of their own and, according to 
the retributive critique, no capacity to make moral choices.47 Stated 
differently, a corporation does not have moral capacity independent of 
the natural persons who are its employees, officers, and board 
members — or, in rare cases, own its stock.48 
The individuals who work for a company have souls to damn: they 
have the mental capacity to choose whether to conform their conduct 
to societal norms and the free will to act morally or immorally. We 
could ascribe moral culpability to a corporation based on the moral 
 
 43 Id. at 390. 
 44 Id. at 410. 
 45 See id. at 413 44 (arguing that equity fines, adverse publicity, integration of 
criminal and civil remedies, restitution, and corporate probation would increase 
corporate deterrence more effectively than monetary penalties alone). 
 46 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. 1362(5) (2012) (including corporations in the definition of 
“person” under the Clean Water Act).  
 47 Byam, supra note 40, at 585 (citation omitted). 
 48 See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 19, at 323 (“Corporations are webs of 
contractual relationships consisting of individuals who band together for their mutual 
economic benefit.”). 
  
2016] The Pendulum Swings 1247 
culpability of its employees or agents.49 After all, we allow individuals 
to act on behalf of the corporation, and we impose criminal liability on 
the corporation for the acts of its employees. Yet moral culpability may 
not transfer as readily as legal responsibility. We impose vicarious 
liability on a corporation based on the acts of an individual employee 
or agent, because the employee or agent acts within the scope of her 
employment at least in part for the benefit of the corporation.50 Yet 
that begs the question of whether we can attach moral culpability to 
the corporation based on the acts of that individual employee or agent. 
What if every other individual associated with the corporation 
ascribed to a different set of moral values? Would we still attribute the 
immoral choice of one individual to the entire corporate entity? 
Perhaps it would be easier to ascribe moral culpability to a 
corporation based on the acts and resulting moral culpability of its 
board and its officers. If board members or officers of a company 
engage in criminal behavior, it is far easier to attribute their 
misconduct to the corporation. After all, they set policies and establish 
priorities on behalf of the corporation. Yet if we equate the moral 
culpability of board members and officers with the moral culpability of 
the corporation, we still are making a moral judgment about other 
corporate officials and employees who did not act improperly and may 
have had no such moral failings in their conduct. To limit the harmful 
effects of criminal punishment to those with moral culpability, 
retributivists would limit criminal liability and punishment to 
individual corporate officials who engage in wrongdoing and utilize 
non-criminal alternatives to penalize corporations.51 
To the extent that the retributive critique depends upon the legal 
fiction of corporate personhood, Sara Sun Beale responds that 
“corporations are not fictions. Rather, they are enormously powerful, 
and very real, actors whose conduct often causes very significant harm 
both to individuals and to society as a whole.”52 Professor Beale 
observes that the power wielded by corporations is “enormous and 
unprecedented in human history” and that corporate misconduct — 
 
 49 Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 50 (1997) (corporate morality is an extension of the moral 
culpability of its human agents and thus corporations may be deserving of 
punishment). 
 50 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909); 
United States v. Automated Med. Labs, 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Hilton Hotels, 469 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972).  
 51 Byam, supra note 40, at 583 85. 
 52 Beale, supra note 23, at 1482. 
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the abuse of corporate power — causes substantial harm to individuals 
and society.53 She further explains that “corporations have the ability 
to engage in misconduct that dwarfs that which could be 
accomplished by individuals.”54 
I too have argued that corporations possess an outsized ability to do 
both good or harm in our communities.55 We readily embrace the 
beneficial actions of corporations, from the production of goods and 
employment opportunities, to the innovation and technological 
advancement that are powerful drivers in our economy and that can 
improve our quality of life. If we recognize the potential of 
corporations to make positive contributions to our society, however, 
we must acknowledge that their actions can be harmful, and at times 
in dramatic ways. “Because of [its] sheer size, a corporate polluter can 
cause far more environmental harm than an individual. A company 
that makes unsafe products can create far greater public health 
risks.”56 Nor are these examples from environmental and consumer 
protection law exhaustive. Most corporations strive to meet their legal 
obligations and contribute in a positive way in our communities, but 
there always will be some companies that break the law and risk or 
cause great harm. 
Yet even if the conduct of corporations can cause great harm, which 
might make their acts deserving of criminal punishment, an answer to 
the retributive critique still requires addressing the question of 
whether corporations can be morally culpable for their actions. That 
question, as it turns out, is not nearly as settled as the retributive 
critique suggests. To be sure, there is support for the proposition that 
only individuals have the capacity to act intentionally and that 
corporations lack the intentionality that provides the basis for moral 
capability.57 But there also is support for the contrary view, namely 
that corporations have internal decision structures that allow 
corporations to act intentionally and therefore morally.58 
 
 53 Id. at 1483. 
 54 Id. at 1484. 
 55 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 1334. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See John Ladd, Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations, 54 
MONIST 488, 500 (1970) (arguing that corporations are like machines and thus unable 
to comply with principles of morality); Manuel G. Velasquez, Why Corporations Are 
Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do, 2 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J. 1, 9 (1983) 
(claiming that corporations only act through individuals and therefore lack agency). 
 58 See Denis G. Arnold, Corporate Moral Agency, 30 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 279, 281 
(2006) (concluding that corporations are capable of exhibiting intentionality and thus 
are properly understood to be moral agents); Peter A. French, The Corporation as a 
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The argument that corporations can be moral agents is bolstered by 
the extent to which corporations make business decisions guided by 
ethical and moral principles. Many businesses adhere to the triple-
bottom line approach of corporate social responsibility, which 
emphasizes people, profits, and planet.59 Corporate advertising extols 
virtues such as equal opportunity, maximizing individual potential, 
and healing the planet.60 Indeed, we speak often of good companies: 
businesses that make quality products and provide quality services to 
their customers, treat their employees fairly and compensate them 
well, strive to meet or exceed their legal obligations, and contribute 
positively in their communities. We also recognize that there are bad 
companies: businesses that produce shoddy products, exploit their 
workers and the environment, and who place no emphasis on meeting 
legal obligations or being good corporate citizens.61 The positive and 
negative attributes that we associate with corporations may extend 
beyond ethics and morality but that does not alter the fact that there 
are good and not-so-good corporate citizens, which reflect underlying 
corporate ethics. 
It also merits emphasis that corporations, which enjoy legal status 
independent of their individual officers and employees, also have 
independent corporate cultures.62 Some companies are known for 
 
Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 207 (1979) (“[C]orporations can be full fledged 
moral persons and have whatever privileges, rights and duties are, in the normal 
course of affairs, accorded to moral persons.”). 
 59 See generally JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE 
OF 21ST CENTURY BUSINESS (1999). 
 60 Super Bowl XLIX in February 2015 featured numerous advertisements that 
promoted societal values. See, e.g., Always, Always #LikeAGirl  Super Bowl XLIX, 
YOUTUBE (Feb. 1, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yIxA3o84syY (promoting 
gender equality); Microsoft, Microsoft Super Bowl Commercial 2015: Braylon O’Neill, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wLXRt qRBfU, YOUTUBE (Feb. 1, 2015), (promoting 
stories of maximizing potential through technology); Microsoft, Microsoft Super Bowl 
Commercial 2015: Estella’s Brilliant Bus, YOUTUBE (Feb. 1, 2015), https://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=7cw4jmKQs0E (same); Jeep, Official 2015 Jeep Super Bowl Commercial | 
Beautiful Lands | Jeep Renegade, YOUTUBE (Feb. 1, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=j7LbPdzYrrE (promoting environmental awareness and responsibility). 
 61 See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1180 (1991) (“[T]he corporate ethos 
test . . . will target only the morally culpable corporation for criminal prosecution. 
Thus, the corporations indicted will be the ‘bad’ corporations that have demonstrated 
an intent to violate the law.”); Friedman, supra note 28, at 847 (“[W]e tend to speak 
of corporations as real entities . . . and to describe their personae as we would an 
individual’s personality  as staid or flexible, welcoming or cold, even good or bad”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 62 See generally Gwendolyn Gordon, Culture in Corporate Law, or: A Black 
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going “beyond compliance” in conducting their business affairs, while 
companies that break the law often are criticized for their poor 
compliance cultures. To be sure, those positive and negative 
compliance cultures — as well as the corporate culture in matters 
ranging from human resources to community engagement — are 
shaped by corporate leadership. Yet corporate cultures persist despite 
management changes and influence behavior of individuals within 
those corporations, much as corporate priorities often endure over 
time and affect how individuals within the corporation behave. If 
corporate cultures are ontologically distinct and influential, it would 
follow that corporations have agency and moral culpability distinct 
from that possessed by individuals within the company, in which case 
the retributive critique loses much of its force. 
Of course, ethical and moral behavior of corporations exists on a 
continuum, much as it does for individuals. A corporation could 
engage in wrongdoing, whether because its management fails to 
devote sufficient resources to compliance or because its employees 
have not been trained sufficiently. The company may be a good 
company that has engaged in misconduct, much the same as an 
individual may have a moral lapse and engage in conduct that is not 
typical of her behavior. Prosecutors might exercise discretion and 
decline to charge aberrational behavior, and we might expect greater 
leniency in the face of isolated misconduct than for a pattern of 
misconduct. 
But how prosecutors exercise their discretion with regard to 
corporate misconduct — and the degree to which they might find the 
underlying acts deserving of punishment — is a different question 
from whether corporations are morally culpable. Individuals do not 
have to be immoral in all of their actions to be morally culpable for 
their misconduct. Likewise, a corporation does not have to be immoral 
in all of its actions for it to be morally culpable for its misconduct. 
Under a retributive approach we properly focus on the defendant’s 
moral culpability for the criminal act; we do not excuse or mitigate 
conduct if the defendant is otherwise morally upright. Even a 
corporation that is law-abiding in most other respects could be 
morally culpable for its crimes, if we accept the proposition that 
corporations have decision-making capacities and identities distinct 
from their individual agents.63 
 
Corporation, a Christian Corporation, and a Maori Corporation Walk into a Bar . . ., 39 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 353 (2016). 
 63 An alternative view is that corporations are deserving of blame from a 
retributivist perspective, even if we cannot resolve the debate about their moral 
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B. The Utilitarian Critique of Corporate Criminal Liability 
My colleague Vic Khanna provides a classic utilitarian critique of 
corporate criminal liability in his article Corporate Criminal Liability: 
What Purpose Does It Serve?64 Professor Khanna argues that corporate 
criminal liability emerged as a vicarious liability doctrine in the early 
1900s because civil penalties were not available to address corporate 
misconduct.65 His claim draws support from the Supreme Court 
decision in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United 
States,66 which rejected claims that corporations should not be 
immune from criminal prosecution because doing so “would virtually 
take away the only means of effectually controlling the subject-matter 
[interstate commercial transactions] and correcting the abuses aimed 
at [it].”67 Of course, with the expansion of civil enforcement regimes 
in the intervening decades, there now are other ways to effectually 
control wrongful business practices.68 
Professor Khanna therefore asks whether civil penalties can provide 
the same utilitarian benefits as criminal penalties and at a lower cost to 
society. Utilitarian goals of punishment include incapacitation, 
deterrence, and rehabilitation of criminal defendants.69 Incapacitation 
is not applicable in the corporate context, since it involves the 
incarceration of defendants to protect the public from harm, which is 
not an option for corporate defendants. Deterrence and rehabilitation 
both can be achieved by corporate criminal prosecution — deterrence 
by creating incentives for corporations to comply with the law and 
making it more costly to violate the law; rehabilitation by mandating 
corporate structural reforms, including corporate compliance 
programs, as terms of probation.70 Professor Khanna focuses on 
 
agency, because corporate crime evinces a failure of corporate management regardless 
of whether they are involved in the wrongdoing. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by 
Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility in the Face of Corporate Crime, 63 
HASTINGS L.J. 411, 451 (2012) [hereinafter Guilty by Proxy]. 
 64 Khanna, supra note 21, at 1478. 
 65 Id. at 1485 86. 
 66 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
 67 Id. at 496. 
 68 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (c) (2012) (establishing criminal, civil, and 
administrative penalties for violations of the Clean Water Act). 
 69 See Frase, supra note 36, at 70. 
 70 See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 890 91 
(2007) (describing DOJ’s goal of using prosecution to increase compliance, change 
corporate culture, and spur other structural reforms); Uhlmann, After the Spill, supra 
note 29, at 1448 52 (describing the deterrent effects of corporate criminal prosecution 
in the context of oil and drilling companies). 
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deterrence and whether civil penalties might be just as effective as 
criminal penalties in promoting compliance and preventing 
violations.71 
Under the economic approach that Professor Khanna supports, 
crime will be deterred efficiently if penalties are set at levels high 
enough to discourage unlawful behavior even when discounted for the 
likelihood that the violation will be detected by the government.72 
Since the likelihood of detection is less than 100%, penalties must be 
correspondingly greater than the cost of compliance.73 Otherwise, the 
rational economic actor might be better off saving money on 
compliance, especially when the risk of being caught if violations 
occur is low. But penalties cannot be set too high, particularly in a 
legal regime with vicarious liability, or socially desirable business 
activity will be chilled.74 If penalties are properly calibrated in this 
fashion, optimal deterrence should result.75 
Professor Khanna considers monetary and reputational penalties as 
the primary tools for achieving optimal deterrence. Standing alone, 
civil fines and criminal fines offer the same deterrence inasmuch as 
they are monetized and reduced to the same degree by the applicable 
risk of detection. Professor Khanna acknowledges that the reputational 
harm of criminal penalties arguably might be greater than the stigma 
attached to civil penalties.76 Professor Khanna argues that monetary 
penalties are a more precise and efficient penalty, however, since we 
have no ability to determine accurately how much reputational 
 
 71 See Khanna, supra note 21, at 1493 94. 
 72 Accord Arlen, supra note 22, at 834 (discussing how the economic approach of 
corporate criminal liability sanctions the wrongdoer to deter crime); see Khanna, supra 
note 21, at 1533 (“A desirable system should permit the imposition of cash fines and 
supplementary sanctions, such as equity fines or a loss of license, when cash fines are 
insufficient.”). 
 73 As previously noted, environmental crimes are the largest area of corporate 
criminal prosecution based on number of convictions. Garrett, Globalized Corporate 
Prosecutions, supra note 10, at 1873. Yet the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency has only 200 special agents, which makes it impossible to investigate all 
instances of environmental violations that might warrant criminal enforcement. 
 74 See Khanna, supra note 21, at 1514 16 (“[T]he possibility of a severe sanction 
under an uncertain legal standard may chill desirable behavior . . . .”); cf. Arlen, supra 
note 22 at 835 36, 843 (arguing that a strict vicarious liability regime may chill 
corporate detection and enforcement expenditures). 
 75 See, e.g., Fischel & Sykes, supra note 19, at 342 43 (claiming that “nothing was 
gained by prosecuting Exxon criminally” for the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and that 
“[c]ivil penalties against Exxon levied through the tort system were sufficient to 
achieve optimal deterrence”). 
 76 Khanna, supra note 21, at 1508 09. 
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damage will occur based on a criminal prosecution, conviction, and 
sentence.77 And, according to Professor Khanna, no one benefits from 
the reputational damage to a corporation, in contrast to a fine that can 
be used by the government for future enforcement efforts or other 
societal benefits.78 He therefore claims that a properly calibrated civil 
enforcement regime is preferable to criminal liability at least to the 
extent that deterrence is the objective.79 
If one accepts the view that reputational harm and other non-
monetary sanctions can be monetized, Professor Khanna might be 
right that the deterrent value of civil penalties could equal the 
deterrent value of criminal penalties. Courts could increase the 
applicable civil fine by whatever amount were necessary to account for 
the reduced reputational damage and arrive at an enhanced civil fine 
that would have an equivalent deterrent effect as the criminal penalty. 
Yet, putting aside for now the question of whether the expressive 
value of criminal prosecution would warrant criminal liability — a 
view that Professor Khanna rejects — there are at least three 
challenges to relying solely on civil enforcement.80 
First, civil penalties will only deter to the same degree as criminal 
penalties if civil penalties are at least as great if not larger than criminal 
penalties. As a theoretical matter, this might not be a challenge; as a 
practical matter, it could be insurmountable. In some areas of the law, 
civil penalties are comparable to potential criminal penalties. For 
example, although financial institutions were not prosecuted criminally 
for their roles in the financial crisis, JP Morgan Chase and Citigroup 
both paid multi-billion dollar civil penalties for their misconduct.81 In 
the Gulf oil spill, BP paid $20.8 billion to resolve civil claims — 
including $5.5 billion in civil penalties — amounts that exceed the $4.5 
billion the company paid in criminal penalties.82 
 
 77 Id. at 1503 04 (“[W]e should prefer cash fines over reputational sanctions as 
long as the corporation is not judgment proof.”). 
 78 Id. at 1503.  
 79 Id. at 1511. 
 80 See infra Part II for a discussion of the expressive value of corporate criminal 
prosecution. 
 81 Devlin Barrett & Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P. Morgan, U.S. Settle for $13 
Billion, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304439804579207701974094982; Andrew Grossman & Christina 
Rexrode, Citigroup to Pay $7 Billion in Mortgage Probe, WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/citigroup to pay 7 billion to resolve mortgage probe
1405335864. 
 82 Kevin McGill, US Judge OKs $20B Settlement from 2010 BP Oil Spill, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Apr. 4, 2016), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/062ee20eed004fcf94f151f5fb29b8e7/us
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Yet criminal penalties can be as much as twice the gain or loss 
associated with a criminal offense,83 which often would far exceed the 
available civil penalties. In the Gulf oil spill example, the maximum 
criminal penalty was more than $40 billion based on the economic 
losses and natural resource damages associated with the spill.84 The 
maximum civil penalty for BP was $13 billion — and for other 
companies was far lower. For worker safety, mine safety, consumer 
protection, food and drug, and wildlife violations, criminal penalties 
dwarf what would be available under civil penalty regimes.85 Of 
course, Congress could address these disparities, but it has not done 
so in the worker safety context for decades86 — and there are no civil 
penalties for arguably the oldest wildlife protection law, the Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act.87 
Second, it may be a mistake to assume that reputational harm can be 
monetized and imposed instead as monetary fines. To the extent that 
lost business results, it might theoretically be possible to know ex ante 
the amount of those losses. In reality, it would almost never be 
 
judge oks 20b settlement 2010 bp oil spill 0; Steven Mufson, BP Settlement Will Cost $20.8 
Billion, Justice Department Says, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/business/economy/bp settlement will cost 208 billion justice department says/2015/ 
10/05/abb82b1e 6b78 11e5 b31c d80d62b53e28 story.html. BP previously paid $4 billion 
in criminal penalties to resolve Clean Water Act, Migratory Bird Treaty Act, manslaughter, 
and false statement charges based on the spill; the company paid an additional $500 
million to address securities violations. Judgment, United States v. BP Exploration & Prod. 
Inc., No 2:12 CR 00292 (E.D. La. 2013). 
 83 See Alternative Fines Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2012). 
 84 BP has paid approximately $14.7 billion in economic losses and agreed to pay nearly 
$8 billion in natural resource damages. See Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Claims and Other 
Payments, Public Report, BRIT. PETROLEUM (July 31, 2015), http://www.bp. 
com/content/dam/bp country/en us/PDF/GOM/Public Report July 2015.pdf (regarding 
economic losses); Campbell Robertson, John Schwartz & Richard Pérez Peña, $18.7 Billion 
Deal Reached with BP in Gulf Oils Spill, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/us/bp to pay gulf coast states 18 7 billion for
deepwater horizon oil spill.html? r=0 (regarding natural resource damages). 
 85 See, e.g., Mine, Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. § 820 (2012) (addressing mine 
safety); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136l (2012) 
(covering food and drug violation penalties); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 
1540 (2012) (protecting wildlife); see also David M. Uhlmann, Prosecuting Worker 
Endangerment: The Need for Stronger Criminal Penalties for Violations of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, ADVANCE: J. ACS ISSUE GROUPS, Spring 2009, at 191, 
195 96 [hereinafter Prosecuting Worker Endangerment] (stating that criminal penalties 
can be much higher than administrative penalties under the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act). 
 86 See Uhlmann, Prosecuting Worker Endangerment, supra note 85, at 201 (showing 
that criminal provisions of worker safety laws have not been amended since 1970s). 
 87 See 16 U.S.C. § 707 (2012). 
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possible to predict lost business from reputational damage — and, 
given the number of factors that can contribute to lower revenues, it 
may not even be possible to assess reputational harm after the fact.88 
For example, there is anecdotal evidence that consumers avoided 
using Exxon and BP gas stations after their oil spills but that their 
reluctance was not widespread, at least in part because “boycotts” are 
more likely to affect independent franchisees than oil producers.89 On 
the other hand, the Volkswagen emissions scandal, at least for now, 
appears to have alienated some customers permanently.90 
Moreover, prospective uncertainty about how much lost business 
will occur has a deterrent value that a fixed penalty cannot provide. If 
a company has few competitors and inelastic demand for its product 
or services, lost business may be limited. In a competitive marketplace, 
however, and particularly one where demand for a company’s product 
or services is elastic, lost business could be substantial. In those 
circumstances, corporations might seek to avoid the reputational harm 
of a criminal conviction in part because it is hard to know how much 
lost business would occur as a result.91 
An economist might protest that uncertainty about reputational 
harm and resulting lost business leads to inefficient allocation of 
resources, since companies cannot determine what sanction they will 
face if they commit violations and are prosecuted. Yet that is precisely 
why reputational harm is a powerful deterrent. Just as we are more 
likely to comply with the law when we are afraid of getting caught — 
like when we are careful about our speed because there might be a 
speed trap ahead — we are more likely to avoid violations when we 
are uncertain about how large any resulting penalties will be. When 
we are certain about the likelihood of detection and amount of 
punishment, the sanction becomes a price and loses deterrent value, 
 
 88 Buell, Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, supra note 25, at 510 12 
(describing the many variables influencing reputational effect). 
 89 See Kate Sheppard, Should You Boycott BP?, MOTHER JONES (June 14, 2010), 
http://www.motherjones.com/blue marble/2010/06/should you boycott bp. 
 90 See, e.g., Richard Conniff, Revenge of the Jetta, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2015, at SR5. 
 91 In the Volkswagen example, it remains to be seen how much the emissions 
scandal will hurt sales. The company reported a 2% decline in sales for 2015, at least 
some of which was attributable to the emissions scandal. See David McHugh, German 
Automaker Volkswagen Says Global Sales Fell 2 Percent Last Year Amidst Emissions 
Scandal, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.usnews. 
com/news/business/articles/2016 01 08/scandal hit volkswagen brand sees 2015 sales
fall 48 pct. The extent to which sales rebound in 2016 and beyond will depend upon 
many variables, including the company’s ability to recall and retrofit affected vehicles and 
whether lost sales are limited to VW vehicles or spread to other Volkswagen brands.  
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which is particularly problematic in the criminal context where the 
optimal societal outcome is that no crime occurs. 
Third, criminal enforcement may have the ability to change the 
culture of organizations in ways that civil penalties cannot. The stigma 
of a criminal conviction extends beyond reputational harm in the 
marketplace; it also extends to the internal dynamics of a corporation. 
I would suggest that criminal prosecution may have an effect in the 
board room and in the corporate suite in ways that civil enforcement 
does not.92 There are numerous examples of companies that paid civil 
penalties and continued to have compliance problems — until they 
were criminally prosecuted and then made far greater efforts to 
comply with the law. One example is the pipe manufacturing 
company McWane, Inc., which committed egregious worker safety 
and environmental violations for years, even after incurring civil 
penalties for its infractions, until it was prosecuted at five separate 
facilities and forced to pay more than $25 million in criminal fines and 
penalties.93 Since the prosecution, McWane has invested extensive 
resources in worker safety and environmental compliance.94 Another 
example is Central Industries, which committed approximately 1114 
permit violations, exceeding pollutant limitations in the company’s 
Clean Water Act permit by hundreds of percentage points and its 
authorized flow rate by millions of gallons.95 Its misconduct continued 
for more than a decade, even though the company faced civil 
 
 92 Indeed, impacts may extend to lower level managers as well. Sally S. Simpson et 
al., An Empirical Assessment of Corporate Environmental Crime Control Strategies, 103 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 231, 239 (2013) (“Although the literature is slim and 
contradictory, there is evidence that firm level stigmatic consequences trickle down to 
responsible managers.”); see Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational 
Penalty for Corporate Crime: Evidence, 42 J.L. & ECON. 489, 523 (1999); Jonathan M. 
Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 581, 605 07 (2008) (discussing reputational penalties’ effects on 
corporations). 
 93 See Uhlmann, Prosecuting Worker Endangerment, supra note 85, at 196 97 
(describing the investigation of McWane and the subsequent pleas and fines). 
Numerous individuals also were prosecuted for crimes at three of the facilities where 
McWane faced criminal charges. Id. at 197. 
 94 See A Dangerous Business Revisited, FRONTLINE (Feb. 5, 2008), http://www.pbs. 
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/mcwane/etc/synopsis.html; McWane, EPA in Landmark 
Environmental Settlement, FOUNDRY MAG. (July 14, 2010), http://foundrymag.com/ 
meltpour/mcwane epa landmark environmental settlement.  
 95 United States v. Cent. Indus., Inc., No. 3:00CR18WS (S.D. Miss. 2000); see 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Central Industries, Inc. Pleads Guilty to 26 Felony 
Violations in Mississippi Water Pollution Case (Nov. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Central 
Industries Press Release], available at http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0uorDgBoVB1. 
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penalties, until the company was prosecuted, pleaded guilty, and paid 
a $13 million criminal fine and $1 million in restitution.96 
Criminal prosecution also may affect employee morale, retention, 
and recruitment in ways that civil penalties do not. While fines under 
criminal and civil regimes could be equalized, at least in theory, it is 
far less clear that a civil enforcement action could ever focus board, 
management, and employee attention on compliance to the same 
extent that criminal prosecution does. Criminal and civil enforcement 
are different in kind and different in their effects. Much as the societal 
message is different, as I discuss in Part II, the impact within a 
company and the resulting deterrence may be different, at least for 
specific deterrence of that company. 
Other distinctions between criminal and civil enforcement may 
further increase the deterrent effects of corporate criminal liability. 
When companies plead guilty in criminal cases, as most corporate 
defendants do, they must admit their wrongdoing,97 which in many 
cases requires a senior corporate official to appear in court and admit 
to the company’s misconduct. Civil settlements sometimes require 
similar admissions — most notably in some Securities and Exchange 
Commission actions — but the majority of civil settlements stipulate 
that the defendant “neither admits nor denies” wrongdoing.98 In 
addition to requiring greater accountability, as I discuss in Part II, 
admissions of wrongdoing — like the stigma of criminal conviction 
and punishment — may also focus companies on compliance more 
than civil settlements.99 
Finally, criminal convictions have collateral consequences that 
increase their deterrent value. Perhaps the best-known example is the 
automatic disqualification for banks and other financial institutions 
that issue securities, which purportedly was the basis for deferred 
prosecution and non-prosecution of banks until the government 
 
 96 Central Industries Press Release, supra note 95. 
 97 Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 10, at 1804 n.112 (noting 
that, in accordance with the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations § 9 28.1300, a corporation must provide enough facts showing its guilt 
when pleading guilty to prevent future assertions of innocence). 
 98 See Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of Wrongdoing in Public 
Enforcement of Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 505, 515 17 (2013) (describing how failing to 
require corporations to admit wrongdoing in civil settlements “squanders” the 
deterrence benefits of enforcement). 
 99 Admissions of wrongdoing also may increase the deterrent effects of criminal 
punishment, since corporations are collaterally estopped from denying the underlying 
conduct in any related civil lawsuits (and therefore may be more likely to incur 
liability and damages in those suits). See id. at 512. 
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decided to grant waivers.100 Companies that are convicted of criminal 
violations also may face suspension or debarment from government 
contracting. For example, some environmental crimes, such as 
convictions under the Clean Water Act, impose mandatory loss of 
government contracts.101 Suspension and debarment is not part of the 
punishment for criminal violations; rather it serves remedial purposes. 
Companies are prohibited from entering new contracts with the 
government until they address the conditions that gave rise to their 
conviction.102 In the typical case, that means negotiating with the 
government over the terms of a compliance program that will prevent 
future violations. No suspension and debarment authority exists for 
civil violations nor would it be practical for civil violations to trigger 
loss of government contracting given the much larger number of civil 
violations that occur across all regulatory programs. 
What emerges from this analysis is the view that criminal penalties 
are different than civil penalties, if not in the fines that they produce 
(which, at least in theory, could be equalized) but in the effect they 
have on organizations, the accountability they require, and the 
collateral consequences that result. Prosecutors must use care in how 
they impose criminal sanctions: as Jennifer Arlen notes, there are 
circumstances where the prospect of criminal prosecution reduces 
incentives for companies to audit their activities and correct and self-
report violations.103 In addition, there may be circumstances where 
criminal sanctions would cause harm to innocent third parties, such as 
the Wake Med case in North Carolina where criminal prosecution of a 
rural hospital would have jeopardized access to health care for elderly 
and poor residents who depended upon Medicare and Medicaid 
benefits.104 But the utilitarian critique of corporate criminal liability 
 
 100 Banks that commit criminal violations are ineligible issuers under Rule 405 of 
the Securities Act of 1933. JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Barclays, and Royal Bank of 
Scotland received disqualification waivers when they agreed to plead guilty to 
currency manipulation. See Michael Corkery & Ben Protess, Banks Admit Scheme to 
Rig Currency Price, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2015, at A1. 
 101 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (2012) (prohibiting federal agencies from contracting with 
any person convicted under the Clean Water Act “until the [EPA] Administrator 
certifies that the condition giving rise to such conviction has been corrected”). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Arlen, supra note 22, at 835 36, 843, 848. 
 104 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 1321 22. 
Collateral consequences to innocent third parties are the primary justification offered 
by the Justice Department for entering deferred prosecution and non prosecution 
agreements instead of seeking criminal convictions. Id. at 1320. But the Justice 
Department has not required its prosecutors to demonstrate that collateral 
consequences are present  nor is there empirical evidence that significant collateral 
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fails on its own terms. Deterrence is central to utilitarian theories of 
criminal punishment — and deterrence is greater when a company 
may be criminally liable for egregious misconduct, along with the 
corporate officials who may be liable as individuals. 
II. THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTION 
Fifty years ago, Joel Feinberg wrote that criminal punishment was 
different from other kinds of penalties because of the “symbolic 
significance” of the criminal sanction.105 Professor Feinberg did not 
purport to be the first scholar to focus on the expressive function of 
punishment. Other moral philosophers, most notably Henry M. Hart, 
claimed that community condemnation was an essential feature of 
criminal punishment.106 As Professor Hart explained: 
What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that 
distinguishes it, it is ventured, is the judgment of community 
condemnation which accompanies . . . its imposition. . . . [A 
crime] is conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, 
will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral 
condemnation of the community.107 
Professor Feinberg went further than Professor Hart and argued that 
condemnation involved not only an expression of disapproval but also 
an expression of societal resentment.108 He explained that society must 
express its disavowal of criminal conduct, make clear its non-
acquiescence in impermissible behavior, vindicate the rule of law, and 
absolve the innocent.109 
Scholars disagree about whether expressive theory is an 
independent justification for criminal punishment or merely a 
restatement of aspects of retributive or utilitarian theories.110 To the 
extent that condemnation reflects a societal judgment about the 
wrongfulness of behavior, expressive theory has a retributive quality. 
Societal condemnation also may have deterrent effects, inasmuch as 
 
consequences have been avoided. See id. at 1322. 
 105 Feinberg, supra note 30, at 400. 
 106 See id. at 401 (acknowledging the legal community’s general acceptance of the 
idea that community condemnation is essential for punishment). 
 107 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
401, 404 05 (1958) (quoted in Feinberg, supra note 30, at 401). 
 108 Feinberg, supra note 30, at 403. 
 109 Id. at 404 08. 
 110 See Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 33, at 601. 
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defendants would want to avoid the associated stigma, which suggests 
a utilitarian quality. On the other hand, there is a degree to which 
both retributive and utilitarian theory are focused on the defendant’s 
behavior and not on the societal messaging that accompanies criminal 
prosecution, which might indicate that expressive theory is a 
standalone justification for criminal liability and punishment. 
My goal here is not to resolve the question of whether expressive 
theory is an independent justification for criminal punishment. Instead, 
I want to focus on how the values associated with expressive theory 
resonate in the analysis of the role of corporate criminal prosecution. I 
hope to expand understanding of the expressive function of corporate 
criminal prosecution beyond the concept of societal condemnation of 
the defendant, although I agree that is a key attribute of the expressive 
function. Criminal prosecution of corporations also reflects the societal 
imperative to respond to illegal behavior in a way that upholds the rule 
of law, reinforces core societal values, provides accountability, and 
ensures that justice has been done. 
In this Part, I consider corporate criminal prosecution from an 
expressive perspective.111 First, I assess the degree to which corporate 
criminal liability involves line-drawing and norm-setting that is 
essential to upholding the rule of law and validates the choices of 
companies who meet their legal obligations. Second, I analyze societal 
condemnation as a sanction for unlawful behavior and how the stigma 
or shame that accompanies criminal punishment is particularly 
significant in the corporate context. Third, I address how 
accountability and the sense that justice has been done is necessary in 
the face of corporate wrongdoing — and how corporate criminal 
prosecution promotes the societal catharsis that must take place for us 
to move beyond the harmful effects of wrongdoing. 
A. The Line-Drawing and Norm-Setting Functions of Corporate 
Criminal Liability 
A central purpose of the criminal law is the expression of societal 
values about what conduct will not be tolerated.112 The criminal law 
 
 111 I will use the term “corporate criminal prosecution” to describe both corporate 
criminal liability and corporate criminal punishment. I refer to “corporate criminal 
liability” as the corporate misconduct that gives rise to criminal liability, which we 
might think of as a definitional question of what conduct is criminalized. I refer to 
“corporate criminal punishment” as the sanction we impose when corporate criminal 
liability is present. The two are related but analytically distinct concepts. 
 112 See Friedman, supra note 28, at 842 43 (“Criminal liability in turn expresses the 
community’s condemnation of the wrongdoer’s conduct by emphasizing the standards 
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performs this line-drawing function by delineating what conduct will 
give rise to criminal liability — and then reinforces the message by 
authorizing criminal punishment. In some instances, the criminal law 
sets a boundary between lawful and unlawful conduct. Bank robbery 
and kidnapping are crimes; there are no circumstances where robbing 
a bank or kidnapping another person involves lawful conduct. In 
other instances, the criminal law sets a boundary between types of 
unlawful conduct. It is unlawful to drive over the speed limit; 
speeding becomes criminal when it recklessly endangers others or if a 
death occurs because of the driver’s negligent speeding. 
The criminal law is not the only way that the law expresses societal 
values and demarcates between lawful and unlawful conduct. Civil 
laws also perform line-drawing functions that express societal values. 
For example, anti-discrimination laws prohibit employment 
discrimination based on race or gender, which helps ensure that all 
people are treated equally in employment decisions.113 Discrimination 
based on race or gender offends core societal values and, if proven, can 
result in substantial civil liabilities. We reserve criminal liability, 
however, for misconduct that is more egregious or is committed with a 
more culpable mental state — or both. If the same discriminatory 
animus results in intentionally causing bodily injury to another 
person, it becomes a hate crime and subjects the defendant to criminal 
prosecution.114 Both civil and criminal violations involve unlawful 
conduct, but criminal violations are qualitatively different or worse. As 
John Diamond explains, “what is criminally wrong and right must be 
something more than what is merely civilly wrong and right.”115 
Corporate criminal liability provides the same line-drawing function 
as the criminal law does in other contexts. A broad array of rules 
governs the activities of corporations, including but not limited to 
labor, consumer safety, environmental, antitrust, securities, and tax 
laws. We expect companies to comply with all of these laws, and we 
may impose civil liability when they fail to meet their obligations. But 
 
for appropriate behavior  that is, the standards by which persons and goods 
properly should be valued.”); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and 
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 362 (1997) (arguing that positions that the criminal law 
takes are “suffused with meaning” about “what kind of life the community views as 
virtuous”). 
 113 See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e 2000e 17 
(2012) (prohibiting employer discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, national 
origin, and religion). 
 114 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012) (criminalizing certain offenses involving actual or 
perceived race, color, religion, or national origin). 
 115 Diamond, Crisis in the Ideology of Crime, supra note 31, at 309. 
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some violations are more serious than others, not just in degree but in 
kind, which we express by imposing criminal liability. As a normative 
matter, we reserve criminal liability for the most egregious corporate 
misconduct, to express the societal view about what corporate 
behavior will not be tolerated under any circumstances.116 
Of course, the normative proposition that we reserve corporate 
criminal liability for egregious violations may or may not be 
descriptive. There is substantial debate about whether we criminalize 
too much conduct in the United States, particularly in the regulatory 
context where most corporate crime occurs.117 On the other hand, 
there also are instances where our laws contain inadequate criminal 
provisions, such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act,118 which 
makes it a crime to commit a worker safety violation only if the 
defendant acts willfully and an employee dies.119 Knowing violations 
that result in death or willful violations that result in serious injuries 
only give rise to civil penalties.120 Resolving questions about what 
corporate misconduct should be criminalized is beyond the scope of 
this article, but the expressive function of corporate criminal liability 
highlights the need for criminal sanctions to focus on corporate 
 
 116 See id. 
 117 The House Judiciary Committee created a bipartisan task force on over
criminalization in May 2013. Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives, House 
Judiciary Committee Creates Bipartisan Task Force on Over Criminalization 
(May 5, 2013), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2013/5/ 
housejudiciarycommitteecreatesbipartisantaskforceonovercriminalization. The task 
force was reauthorized in February 2014. Press Release, U.S. House of 
Representatives, House Judiciary Committee Reauthorizes Bipartisan Over
Criminalization Task Force (Feb. 5, 2014), available at http://judiciary. 
house.gov/index.cfm/2014/2/house judiciary committee reauthorizes bipartisan over
criminalization task force. See also Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 
AM. U. L. REV. 703, 712 (2005) (arguing that the government readily misuses crime 
and punishment); Paul S. Rosenzweig, The Over Criminalization of Social and Economic 
Conduct, 7 HERITAGE FOUND. LEGAL MEMORANDUM, Apr. 17, 2003, at 8 12 (arguing that 
criminal law today punishes those who have no bad intent or actual knowledge of the 
law); cf. John L. Diamond, The Myth of Morality and Fault in Criminal Law Doctrine, 34 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 112 (1996) (“[C]riminal law groups selective samples of the 
reprehensible with the innocent and effectively condemns both.”); Stuart P. Green, 
Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral 
Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1535 (1997) (describing the 
increased use of criminal law in regulatory offenses and the potentially negative 
consequences). 
 118 Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 678 (2012). 
 119 29 U.S.C. § 666 (2012). 
 120 Uhlmann, Prosecuting Worker Endangerment, supra note 85, at 195 96. 
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misconduct that is most egregious and warrants the strongest possible 
societal response. 
The criminal law is our most powerful tool for expressing what 
conduct is outside the bounds of acceptable corporate behavior — 
what I have referred to as the line-drawing function of corporate 
criminal liability. The criminal law also is our most powerful tool for 
expressing how we expect corporations to conduct their affairs — 
what I call the norm-setting function of corporate criminal liability. 
The criminal provisions of the Clean Water Act provide an example of 
both functions.121 The Clean Water Act requires facilities that 
discharge pollutants into waters of the United States to obtain 
permits.122 Facilities must self-monitor their compliance with permit 
limits and submit discharge monitoring reports to the government.123 
When the reports contain accurate information, regulators have 
reliable information about pollution activity and are better able to 
ensure that state water quality standards are satisfied. When the 
reports contain false information, the self-monitoring system created 
by the Clean Water Act is undermined and harmful pollution may go 
undetected. Criminal prosecution of corporations that submit false 
reports makes clear that it is unacceptable to mislead regulators about 
permit compliance — and reinforces the norm that companies are 
expected to be truthful in their communications with the government. 
Corporate criminal liability thus becomes an essential tool for 
upholding the rule of law and reinforcing societal norms. We 
repudiate the choices made by companies who violate the law and 
ensure both that they do not profit from their misconduct but also that 
they cannot treat any resulting penalties as merely a “cost of doing 
business” (i.e. paying a price or fee to engage in the conduct). We 
validate the choices made by law-abiding companies, who must 
commit substantial resources to meet their legal obligations and 
should not be at a competitive disadvantage with companies who 
break the law. 
Conversely, when we do not impose criminal liability upon 
corporations that commit egregious violations of the law, we blur the 
lines that the criminal law establishes between conduct that is 
 
 121 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2012). 
 122 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342, 1344 (2012). 
 123 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (2012) (requiring point source polluters to maintain records, 
make reports, and monitor their discharges); 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(j) (2015) 
(promulgating regulations for permittees to retain records that must include certain 
requirements); 40 C.F.R. § 122.48 (2015) (requiring permits to specify the proper 
monitoring equipment, monitoring type, and reporting requirements). 
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acceptable and conduct that will not be tolerated. We express to the 
companies that break the law that their conduct is not so egregious that 
it warrants criminal prosecution. We tell companies that are diligent 
about meeting legal obligations that their efforts are valued less by 
society. In the process, we weaken adherence to the rule of law and our 
ability to send societal messages about what corporate behavior is 
unacceptable and what corporate behavior we want to promote. 
B. Societal Condemnation of Corporate Criminal Punishment 
Corporate criminal liability expresses societal values about what 
corporate conduct to promote and what corporate conduct will not be 
tolerated. For the norm-setting and line-drawing of corporate criminal 
liability to be more than aspirational, however, criminal punishment 
must ensue when corporations commit egregious violations of the law. 
The societal condemnation that is expressed by criminal punishment 
is both the distinctive feature of the criminal sanction — as Professors 
Hart and Feinberg recognized124 — as well as the criminal law’s 
unique tool for censuring corporate misconduct. We cannot jail a 
corporation, but we can condemn its conduct by treating it as criminal 
and imposing criminal punishment on the corporation. 
The societal condemnation that accompanies corporate criminal 
punishment serves multiple purposes. First, societal condemnation 
offers a targeted, defendant-specific repudiation of the corporation’s 
misconduct. Corporate criminal liability expresses societal values 
about what corporate conduct is unacceptable by prospectively 
defining certain categories of conduct as criminal. Corporate criminal 
punishment expresses societal views about the unacceptable conduct 
of a specific corporation by retrospectively condemning the criminal 
activity of the corporation. The laws defining corporate conduct as 
criminal have little meaning without the subsequent punishment of 
corporate defendants who violate the laws — and the accompanying 
societal condemnation of their misconduct. 
Second, societal condemnation of corporate criminal behavior is a 
powerful sanction for the corporation. The labeling of corporate 
misconduct as criminal sullies the corporation’s reputation as a law-
abiding and ethical corporation. The company may lose business as a 
result, as discussed in Part I, but reputational harm is a broader 
sanction than lost business. Reputational harm can discourage 
investment in a company and make it more difficult to recruit and 
retain valued employees. Reputational harm also can hamper 
 
 124 See supra notes 105 07 and accompanying text. 
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relationships in the broader business community.125 Fines and lost 
business can be internalized by a corporation and may be viewed 
within the company — and by society — as a price for engaging in 
misconduct. Societal condemnation and the resulting reputational 
harm are sanctions that cannot be fully monetized and therefore can 
have more enduring effects. 
Whether reputational harm persists for a long time or dissipates 
quickly will vary depending on the corporation involved and the 
nature of its misconduct. To some extent, the duration of the stigma of 
criminal prosecution will depend upon factors within the 
corporation’s control, including the degree to which the corporation 
expresses remorse and takes steps to improve its compliance efforts. 
Stigma may nonetheless endure based on factors beyond the 
corporation’s control, such as public perceptions of the wrongdoing 
and the extent to which corporate values are seen as the culprit.126 In 
the interim, the reputational harm of criminal prosecution can be 
significant for corporate management and employees.127 As noted in 
Part I, corporate officers must account to board members and 
shareholders about why the corporation engaged in criminal 
misconduct;128 corporate employees must endure the ignominy of 
working for a corporation condemned as criminal. 
Third, societal condemnation of corporate criminal behavior 
imposes blame on the corporations where misconduct occurs. Samuel 
Buell argues that the blaming function of what he terms “entity 
criminal liability” represents its central function.129 He observes that, 
as a matter of social psychology, organizations often influence 
individuals within their midst and therefore corporations (or 
corporate culture) often may be responsible for misconduct carried 
 
 125 But see Khanna, supra note 21, at 1500 12 (analyzing reputational sanctions and 
concluding such sanctions are “rarely socially desirable in the corporate context”).  
 126 See supra notes 89 91 and accompanying text. 
 127 See generally Buell, Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, supra note 25 
(discussing how constituents, consumers, and audiences take criminal sanctions 
seriously and find reputational effects very important). 
 128 BP chief executive officer Tony Hayward resigned in the wake of the Gulf oil 
spill. Eduard Gismatullin & Brian Swint, BP’s Hayward Quits After Spill Shreds Pledge 
to Improve Safety, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 27, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2010 07 27/hayward s resignation inevitable after bp spill undermined safety
pledge. Volkswagen CEO Martin Winterkorn suffered a similar fate because of the VW 
emissions debacle. Jack Ewing, Rigged Testing by Volkswagen Fells Its C.E.O., N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2015, at A1. 
 129 Buell, Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, supra note 25, at 477 
(“[T]he blaming function of entity criminal liability is linked closely to the utility of 
the doctrine.”). 
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out by individuals within the corporation.130 When that relationship is 
present, Professor Buell proposes that it is proper to blame the 
corporation for criminal activity.131 He suggests that his proposal has 
retributive qualities, inasmuch as the corporation is deserving of 
sanction, and utilitarian benefits, because affixing blame on the 
organization may lead to changes that will prevent future wrongdoing 
— and may motivate other corporations to take steps to improve their 
corporate cultures.132 
I agree with Professor Buell that the blaming function of corporate 
criminal prosecution is an effective expressive tool that vindicates 
societal interests in condemning wrongdoing. I also agree that there 
may be deterrent effects from imposing blame. To the extent that the 
corporation is to blame for the criminal wrongdoing of its employees 
— either because it condones misconduct or increases the likelihood 
that violations will occur because of insufficient compliance efforts 
and/or inadequate training — societal condemnation is appropriate. In 
my experience, as Professor Buell suggests, most corporate crimes are 
attributable to a poor compliance culture.133 
Of course, if societal condemnation has substantial expressive 
benefits, it follows that when corporate wrongdoing occurs and is not 
prosecuted criminally there may be significant expressive costs.134 As I 
have argued elsewhere, when we sanction corporate misconduct with 
a deferred prosecution or civil penalties that do not involve the same 
degree of societal condemnation, we minimize corporate misconduct 
and may risk condoning it.135 When criminal sanctions are not sought, 
we express a societal judgment that the conduct is less egregious. 
“[W]hen society deliberately foregoes answering the wrongdoer 
 
 130 Id. at 493 97 (describing how institutions shape behavior); see also Bucy, supra 
note 61, at 1127 (concluding that “(1) each corporation is distinctive and draws its 
uniqueness from a complex combination of formal and informal factors; (2) the 
formal and informal structure of a corporation can promote, or discourage, violations 
of the law; and (3) this structure is identifiable, observable, and malleable”). 
 131 Buell, Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, supra note 25, at 497 
(“[O]ur blaming practice is rooted in the reality that, in the modern world, 
organizations do influence behavior.”). 
 132 Id. at 516 22 (discussing retribution); id. at 500 12 (discussing deterrence). 
 133 There is at least some empirical research to support these views. “Evidence 
suggests that managers who believe that the corporate culture is tolerant of illegality 
are more likely to violate regulations.” Simpson et al., supra note 92, at 238. 
 134 See Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 49 51 (2012) (discussing how failure to impose criminal liability on 
corporations “risks sending the signal that criminal conduct will be punished  
except where it is committed by a corporation”). 
 135 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 1336. 
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through punishment, it risks being perceived as endorsing his 
valuations [and misconduct].”136 Non-criminal alternatives also 
express to those affected by the misconduct that any harm they 
suffered is less significant. Resulting cynicism about whether 
corporations are above the law erodes public confidence in our 
criminal justice system and thus compounds the harm wrought by 
corporate misconduct. 
C. Societal Catharsis of Corporate Criminal Prosecution 
Prior expressive accounts have focused to varying degrees on the 
normative role of corporate criminal liability and the stigma of societal 
condemnation — but not on how the presence or absence of corporate 
responsibility affects public perceptions of corporate misconduct and 
the fairness of the criminal justice system. I would argue that criminal 
prosecution of corporate misconduct is necessary to maintain public 
trust and to ensure that the criminal justice system promotes fairness 
even when misconduct involves the most powerful actors in our 
economy. When corporate crime is prosecuted, we are more able to 
move past wrongdoing, which I refer to as the process of “societal 
catharsis.” When corporate crime is not addressed, the negative effects 
of corporate misconduct linger, sometimes indefinitely. 
There is no doubt that corporate crime inflicts harm that must be 
addressed by the criminal justice system. In some cases, corporate 
crimes results in catastrophic harm. At the Upper Big Branch Mine in 
West Virginia, twenty-nine miners died because of egregious 
violations of the Mine Safety Act committed by Massey Corporation.137 
In the Gulf oil spill, millions of barrels of oil gushed into the Gulf of 
Mexico causing incalculable harm to the environment and billions of 
dollars of economic losses.138 In the wake of preventable tragedies like 
the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster and the Gulf oil spill, we have a 
societal need to label the misconduct as criminal and condemn the 
corporate malfeasance in the strongest possible terms.139 We expect 
 
 136 Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 33, at 598. 
 137 Uhlmann, 29 Dead Miners, supra note 3. An investigation by the Mine Safety 
and Health Administration revealed over 300 violations of the Mine Safety and Health 
Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801 965 (2012), at the Upper Big Branch Mine, including nine 
flagrant violations that contributed to the explosion and resulting deaths. U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, FATAL UNDERGROUND 
MINE EXPLOSION 2, 15 (2010) [hereinafter “MSHA REPORT”], available at 
http://arlweb.msha.gov/Fatals/2010/UBB/FTL10c0331noappx.pdf. 
 138 Uhlmann, After the Spill, supra note 29, at 1414 16. 
 139 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 1336, 1343
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the corporations involved to admit that their conduct was criminal 
and to be held accountable by the criminal justice system, both so that 
justice is done and also so that we can collectively move on from the 
tragedies wrought by their corporate wrongdoing.140 
The need for societal catharsis may be greatest when corporate 
crime results in tragedy, but I would suggest that it also is present in 
less heralded cases as well. Criminal activity tears at the social fabric 
that binds us together in society.141 An essential feature of the social 
contract is our collective agreement to adhere to the rule of law. To 
uphold the rule of law, we must sanction those who violate the law. 
We expect corporations to meet their legal obligations, just as we 
expect individuals to do so; we must sanction corporate criminality 
just as we must sanction individual criminality.142 By upholding the 
rule of law in the face of criminal activity, we begin to repair the harm 
to the social order caused by criminal conduct. 
We facilitate societal catharsis in at least three other ways when we 
hold corporations responsible for their criminal behavior. First, the 
terminology that we use to describe the conduct matters both for its 
own sake and because it affects our collective sense that justice has 
been done.143 If the conduct involved is criminal, we should call it 
criminal. It does not become less criminal because the actor is a 
corporation. When we use non-criminal terms to describe criminal 
behavior by corporations, we fuel cynicism, undermine confidence in 
the justice system, and hinder societal healing. In contrast, when we 
 
44 (discussing how “labels matter” and that “we communicate far more about our 
condemnation of wrongdoing when we call conduct criminal”). 
 140 While the need for societal healing has not been addressed in prior accounts of 
corporate criminal liability, there is a substantial body of literature regarding the 
societal need for accountability in the transition from oppressive political regimes. See, 
e.g., JON ELSTER, CLOSING THE BOOKS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
(2004) (defining and discussing transitional justice); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN 
VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER MASS GENOCIDE AND MASS 
VIOLENCE (1999) (exploring societal responses to mass violence during transition to 
less oppressive regimes). 
 141 See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson, The Community, in CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR 
CRIME CONTROL 193, 203 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 1995) (asserting 
that empirical studies, although limited in number, consistently show that “crime does 
in fact undermine the social and economic fabric of urban areas”). 
 142 Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 609, 618 19 (1998) (“Punishing corporations, just like punishing natural 
persons, is also understood to be the right way for society to repudiate the false 
valuations that their crimes express.”). 
 143 Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1426 (2009) (asserting that labeling misconduct “criminal” 
has social significance independent of the punishment imposed for the misconduct). 
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use the proper terminology to describe the criminal conduct of 
corporations, we affirm societal values, enhance confidence in the 
justice system, and promote societal catharsis.144 
Second, we foster societal catharsis by requiring corporations to 
accept responsibility for their criminal actions. A corporation that is 
charged with criminal activity must either admit guilt or face a jury 
trial. The “neither admit nor deny” settlements that are common in 
civil enforcement actions are not allowed in the criminal justice 
system except in the rare cases where “nolo contendere” pleas are 
permitted.145 By requiring admissions of guilt in cases resolved by 
guilty plea, the criminal justice system insists on acceptance of 
responsibility from corporations. It is difficult for us to move on from 
wrongdoing when the perpetrator refuses to take responsibility and 
apologize; societal catharsis is far easier when criminal activity gives 
way to admissions of wrongdoing.146 Perhaps this need might be 
addressed by prosecution of culpable individuals within the 
corporation — and guilty pleas or convictions at trial of those 
individuals. But individual culpability does not occur in a vacuum: the 
acts of individual corporate employees reflect the prevailing corporate 
culture and have aggregate effects on behalf of the corporation that 
must be acknowledged for societal catharsis to occur. 
Third, criminal punishment involves condemnation and the 
imposition of blame in ways that other sanctions do not, which also 
facilitates societal catharsis after criminal activity. Professor Feinberg 
noted that part of the expressive function of criminal punishment was 
its statement of societal resentment.147 We should not underestimate 
the degree to which communities need to express their legitimate 
anger in the aftermath of criminal activity. Much as we want criminal 
defendants to admit their wrongdoing — or at least to be found guilty 
by a trial jury — we need express our indignation about how society 
 
 144 It merits emphasis that the criminal prosecution of corporations is not a 
substitute for the prosecution of culpable corporate officials. If only the corporation is 
prosecuted, despite clear evidence of individual wrongdoing, societal catharsis is 
undermined. See infra Part III for a discussion of the relationship between corporate 
and individual prosecution. 
 145 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9 16.010 [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ 
MANUAL] (discussing the strict prosecutorial policies on nolo contendere). 
 146 The restorative justice movement is instructive on the benefits of admissions of 
wrongdoing for victims and offenders, as well as their communities. See generally 
Carrie Menkel Meadow, Restorative Justice: What Is It and Does It Work?, 3 ANNU. REV. 
LAW SOC. SCI. 10.1 (2007) (defining and evaluating the effectiveness of restorative 
justice). 
 147 Feinberg, supra note 30, at 100 01. 
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has been wronged by criminal behavior.148 Expressions of anger are 
part of any healing process and help us move beyond pain.149 When 
there is no forum for expressing anger or resentment, those feelings 
must be repressed, and moving on is difficult. This is an area where 
the expressive function overlaps with retributive justifications; if the 
sanction for corporate crime is non-criminal, the punishment does not 
fit the crime, and societal catharsis is diminished and may not occur at 
all. As Paul Robinson explains, “society as well as the victim requires 
the just deserts punishment. Unless the punishment is imposed, a real 
feeling of incompleteness lingers, and there is a sense that justice has 
not been done. These feelings of incompleteness and sense of failed 
justice are held by those who witness or become aware of the original 
offense as well as by its victim.”150 
Societal catharsis may seem attenuated from the purposes of 
criminal law and more akin to sociological or psychological concerns. 
In addition, to the extent that my focus is on how society recovers 
from corporate criminality, some critics of corporate criminal liability 
might argue that little is accomplished by expressing condemnation or 
imposing blame on inanimate objects like corporations. Albert 
Alschuler has suggested that condemning the corporation is akin to 
deodand, the ancient practice of punishing animals and inanimate 
objects.151 Professor Alschuler likens expression of anger toward 
corporations as similar to him yelling at his computer when it 
malfunctions.152 But, as noted in Part I, corporations both individually 
and in the aggregate have significant impacts in our communities, in 
our economies, and in our political system in ways that other 
inanimate objects do not. Viewed in isolation, societal expressions of 
anger about corporate misconduct may seem similar to frustration 
with an animal or rage against a machine, but indignation is both an 
appropriate response to corporate criminality and an expression of 
community values and what behavior is unacceptable. 
 
 148 See Judith Lewis Herman, Justice from the Victim’s Perspective, 11 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 571, 578 (2005) (arguing that community resentment and 
indignation on behalf of victims is part of restorative justice process despite its 
traditional focus on defendants); see also Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy, supra note 63, at 
447 (arguing from a retributive perspective that corporate criminal liability can be 
appropriate way of discharging our indignation in the face of corporate wrongdoing). 
 149 See, e.g., ELISABETH KUBLER ROSS, ON DEATH AND DYING 44 (1969) (noting that 
anger is the second stage in the healing process after death occurs). 
 150 Paul H. Robinson et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as 
Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 297 (2002). 
 151 Alschuler, Two Ways, supra note 20, at 1372 76. 
 152 Id. at 1373. 
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In sum, we expect justice to be done when criminal wrongdoing 
occurs and no less so when the criminal violations are committed in the 
corporate context. Our faith in the criminal justice system depends on 
the belief that none of us are above the law and all of us are accountable 
for our actions. Nothing breeds cynicism or erodes public confidence 
more than perpetuating the sense that there is a different justice system 
for the rich and powerful, which under almost any definition would 
include corporations. Public cynicism is magnified even more by the 
perception that recent Supreme Court opinions afford free speech rights 
and religious liberties to corporations,153 yet corporations are not always 
held accountable for their misdeeds. If corporations may be persons for 
purposes of our constitutional liberties, they also should be persons for 
purposes of complying with the dictates of the criminal law.154 By 
holding corporations criminally liable and condemning their 
misconduct, we promote the rule of law, demonstrate that the criminal 
justice system can address corporate wrongdoing, and facilitate our 
societal ability to move on after crimes occur. 
III. THE MISUNDERSTOOD RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROSECUTION 
OF CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS 
Although objections to corporate criminal prosecution involve 
different theoretical constructs, the critiques share one common 
ground: corporate crime should be addressed by prosecuting 
responsible individuals within corporations.155 Corporations face 
 
 153 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding 
that, as applied to closely held corporations, regulations requiring employers to 
provide female employees with no cost access to contraception violated the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010) (holding that under the First Amendment, the government cannot prevent 
corporate spending to advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, though 
corporations may not give money directly to campaigns). 
 154 A more nuanced reading of Citizens United is that the public has a right to hear 
all political speech  eliding the question of whether corporations are persons that 
have free speech protections. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Citizens United and the Ineluctable 
Question of Corporate Citizenship, 44 CONN. L. REV. 575, 581 (2012). Likewise, the free 
exercise rights recognized in Hobby Lobby derive from the individual free exercise 
rights of the owners of closely held corporations. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Corporate 
Piety and Impropriety: Hobby Lobby’s Extension of RFRA Rights to the For Profit 
Corporation, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 173, 175 76 (2015). But I would argue that the public 
perception that the decisions are broader and more protective of corporate interests 
fuels anger about lack of accountability for corporate crime and the sense that the law 
treats corporations more favorably. 
 155 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 39, at 407 11 (arguing that the individual must be 
targeted alongside the entity); Khanna, supra note 21, at 1534 (“[C]orporate criminal 
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criminal liability because the acts of their employees and agents are 
imputed to the corporation. From a retributive perspective, the 
culpable individuals deserve punishment, not the corporation that is 
incapable of moral wrongdoing.156 From a utilitarian perspective, the 
prospect of imprisonment is a greater deterrent than the possibility 
that the corporation may pay a monetary fine.157 In addition, 
according to both critiques, focusing on individual misconduct 
ensures that criminal prosecution is targeted to culpable individuals 
and not visited upon third parties, including non-culpable employees, 
shareholders, and perhaps customers.158 
In this Part, I explain why the prosecution of corporations is 
warranted even when individuals are prosecuted. Unlike other 
scholars who support a dual approach to corporate crime,159 however, 
I go further and assert that corporations should be prosecuted for 
corporate wrongdoing even in cases where individuals should not or 
cannot be prosecuted. The need for criminal prosecution and the 
expressive function of punishment may be most apparent in 
“corporate-only” prosecutions. 
A. Charging Both the Corporation and Culpable Individuals 
The Justice Department announced in September 2015 that it would 
be intensifying its efforts to hold individuals accountable for corporate 
wrongdoing.160 I agree that culpable individuals should be prosecuted 
in the corporate context. There is no dispute that individuals can have 
moral culpability. It also is axiomatic that most corporate officials are 
more likely to be deterred by the possibility that their actions could 
result in individual culpability — to include jail time — than by 
concerns about organizational culpability. In the hundreds of 
 
liability may continue to provide enforcement cost savings in situations in which 
pursuing managerial criminal liability is optimal.”).  
 156 See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the retributive critique of corporate 
criminal liability.  
 157 See supra Part I.B for a discussion of the utilitarian critique of corporate 
criminal liability. 
 158 Coffee, supra note 39, at 401 02. 
 159 See, e.g., id. at 410 (“[A] dual focus on the firm and the individual is 
necessary.”); Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 
1789, 1795 (2015) [hereinafter Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat] (arguing that 
corporate prosecutions should be brought in conjunction with charges against 
individuals). 
 160 See Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Yates 
Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download. 
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corporate cases that I supervised or prosecuted during my seventeen 
years at the Justice Department, it always was a priority to identify 
individuals who were appropriate to prosecute, if the law and the facts 
supported criminal charges. In every indictment review, we assessed 
the evidence against the individuals involved in corporate wrongdoing 
and evaluated whether their individual conduct warranted 
prosecution. 
But I reject the notion that prosecutors confronted with corporate 
wrongdoing must choose between prosecuting corporations and 
prosecuting individuals. Corporate crime has far-reaching and 
debilitating effects on our communities. As noted throughout this 
article, some corporate crimes cause catastrophic harm, such as the 
Gulf oil spill, the Upper Big Branch Mine tragedy, and the Enron 
case.161 Other corporate crimes may be less harmful individually but 
cause significant harm in the aggregate. All corporate crime 
undermines the fair competition at the heart of our economic system 
— and all corporate crime involves a violation of the corporation’s 
duty to conduct its affairs in a lawful manner. 
Given the pernicious harm and lawless conduct inherent in 
corporate crime, both corporations and individuals should be held 
accountable when wrongdoing occurs in the corporate setting. At a 
minimum, prosecutors and investigators should have the ability to 
consider charges against both corporations and individuals, so that the 
full range of enforcement options are available to address corporate 
misconduct. The Justice Department prosecution guidelines recognize 
these principles, making clear that there is no binary choice to be 
made between prosecuting corporations and prosecuting individuals 
when corporate crime occurs. “Prosecution of a corporation is not a 
substitute for the prosecution of criminally culpable individuals within 
or without the corporation.”162 There is no reason that we should limit 
societal tools to fight corporate crime, in essence taking on the task 
with one hand tied behind our backs. 
The prosecution of both corporations and individuals offers benefits 
beyond those conferred by using all available resources to combat 
corporate crime. The prosecution of corporations addresses the 
wrongdoing of the corporation as a whole; the prosecution of 
individuals addresses her contribution to the larger corporate 
 
 161 In the Enron case, thousands of employees lost retirement savings. Richard A. 
Oppel, Jr., Employees’ Retirement Plan Is a Victim as Enron Tumbles, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
22, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/22/business/employees retirement plan
is a victim as enron tumbles.html. 
 162 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 145, § 9 28.210. 
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problem. The prosecution of the corporation seeks to change 
corporate behavior in the future; the prosecution of the individual is 
directed at the employee’s behavior in the future. The prosecution of 
the corporation condemns and assigns blame to the corporate culture 
and the misplaced corporate priorities that led to criminal conduct by 
the employee; the prosecution of the individual addresses the poor 
choices made by the individual corporate employee. 
The only circumstances where I would suggest that prosecutors 
might be expected to choose between the prosecution of a corporation 
and the prosecution of an individual would be cases involving small 
family-owned companies or sole proprietorships. In those 
prosecutions, where there is effectively an identity between the 
corporation and the individual, I would prosecute the individual and 
decline to prosecute the corporation.163 I say so because there is 
nothing to be gained in cases involving so-called “Mom and Pop” 
companies and sole proprietorships — no retributive, utilitarian, or 
expressive purpose — that is not already achieved by prosecuting the 
owner of the company.164 
In cases involving larger corporations, the calculus shifts, because 
there is a corporate entity that is larger and distinct from its individual 
members, with influence over the conduct of corporate affairs that 
even a senior management official is unlikely to possess. In the rare 
case where a larger corporation is the alter ego of its board chairman 
or its chief executive officer — and where that person carried out 
unlawful activity on behalf of the corporation — it theoretically might 
be possible to satisfy the goals of criminal prosecution by charging 
only the chairman or chief executive officer. In all other cases, as 
explained in greater detail below, I would argue that charges must be 
brought against the corporation and responsible individuals — and 
that charges should be brought against the corporation even when no 
individual can or should be charged. 
 
 163 Buell, Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, supra note 25, at 535 n.263 
(“It is hard to see the justification for entity criminal liability in cases of sole or near
sole proprietorships. Assuming that entity liability is implicated because of the owner’s 
crime, the entity effectively represents just another personal asset of the offender.”). 
 164 Accord Lynch, supra note 49, at 51 (small and closely held corporations are 
“unlikely to be perceived by the public as having any separate personality” from their 
individual owners and managers). Stated differently, in Mom and Pop companies 
there is no corporate culture independent of the owners nor corporate 
blameworthiness independent of the culpability of the owners. See id. 
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B. Charging the Corporation and Management Officials 
The Justice Department corporate prosecution principals make 
management involvement in misconduct a key factor in the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion involving corporations.165 An argument could 
be made that prosecution of the corporation is not needed if senior 
officials have been prosecuted; the corporation will be forever changed 
by those individual prosecutions and civil enforcement may be 
sufficient against the corporation. Yet where senior officials are 
involved, the culpability of the corporation qua corporation appears 
greatest; it would seem incongruous to decline criminal prosecution of 
the corporation when misconduct reached senior management. 
In Part II, I referenced the prosecution of McWane, Inc., which 
occurred during my tenure as Chief of the Environmental Crimes 
Section at the Justice Department.166 In the McWane prosecutions, we 
brought charges against five McWane subsidiaries: Atlantic States Cast 
Iron Pipe Company, McWane Cast Iron Pipe Company, Pacific States 
Cast Iron Pipe Company, Tyler Pipe, and Union Foundry.167 Three of 
the subsidiaries pleaded guilty; two of the subsidiaries were convicted 
after trials.168 We also prosecuted eleven management officials at three 
of the McWane subsidiaries; eight were convicted at trial, and one 
pleaded guilty.169 The ability to bring charges against the companies 
and the management of the McWane facilities addressed years of 
criminal violations of the environmental laws and the worker safety 
laws at McWane facilities.170 It was essential to hold criminally 
responsible the management officials who carried out the wrongdoing. 
But it was not a coincidence that there were violations at five separate 
McWane facilities. There was a larger corporate culture responsible for 
the crimes at McWane,171 which would not have been addressed 
 
 165 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 145, § 9 28.500 (containing a section 
entitled “Pervasiveness of Wrongdoing Within the Corporation”). 
 166 See supra notes 93 94 and accompanying text. 
 167 Uhlmann, Prosecuting Worker Endangerment, supra note 85, at 7. 
 168 Id.  
 169 James Sandler et al., The McWane Prosecutions, FRONTLINE (Feb. 5, 2008), 
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/mcwane/etc/prosecutions.html. 
 170 Id.; see David Barstow & Lowell Bergman, Criminal Inquiry Under Way at Large 
Pipe Manufacturer, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/ 
15/us/criminal inquiry under way at large pipe manufacturer.html. 
 171 Uhlmann, Prosecuting Worker Endangerment, supra note 85, at 7; see also A 
Dangerous Business: Two Companies, Two Visions, FRONTLINE (Jan. 2003) [hereinafter 
Two Companies], http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/workplace/mcwane/ 
two.html (describing the “McWane Way”). 
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without criminal charges and convictions of the five McWane 
subsidiaries. 
I also have referenced several times the Upper Big Branch Mine 
tragedy, where twenty-nine workers died because of willful violations 
of the Mine Safety Act. In that case, four Massey Corporation officials 
were convicted and sentenced to jail time.172 In addition, prosecutors 
charged Don Blankenship, the chief executive officer of Massey and 
allegedly the prime orchestrator of the criminal conduct at the 
company.173 According to the indictment, Blankenship was the kind of 
“iron-fisted” chief executive officer who could be charged in lieu of 
the corporation. Prosecutors alleged that Blankenship controlled every 
aspect of Massey’s operation in almost despot-like fashion.174 
Blankenship was convicted at trial of conspiracy to violate the Mine 
Safety Act and was sentenced to serve one year in prison.175 
Still, I would argue that Massey also should have been prosecuted, 
given the deadly harm caused by their crimes and the hundreds of 
violations of federal mining laws committed at their mines.176 Massey 
was a notorious violator of mine safety and environmental laws.177 It 
flouted the rule of law and deserved societal condemnation and blame 
for the horrors it wrought as a company. Instead, Massey’s new 
owners were allowed to enter a non-prosecution agreement that sent a 
demoralizing message about how the government viewed the 
misconduct that led to tragedy at the Upper Big Branch mine.178 
 
 172 Convictions Related to the Upper Big Branch Mine, CHARLESTON GAZETTE MAIL (Nov. 
13, 2014), http://www.wvgazettemail.com/article/20141113/GZ01/141119614/1460. 
 173 Indictment, United States v. Blankenship, No. 5:14 cr 00244 (S.D. W. Va., Nov. 
13, 2014) [hereinafter Blankenship Indictment]; see Trip Gabriel, Ex Executive Donald 
Blankenship Is Indicted in Disaster at Coal Mine, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2014, at A12.  
 174 See Blankenship Indictment, supra note 173. 
 175 Alan Blinder, Mine Chief Is Sentenced in Conspiracy Over Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 
2016, at A12; Alan Blinder, Ex Chief of Massey Energy Guilty of Misdemeanor After Mine 
Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2015, at A18. 
 176 MSHA REPORT, supra note 137, at 2, 12; see also Uhlmann, 29 Dead Miners, 
supra note 3 (describing finding by MSHA that Massey’s “unlawful policies and 
practices” were the “root cause” of the nation’s worst mining disaster in 40 years). 
 177 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 1295 97.  
 178 Id. at 1300 (“[O]n the same day that MSHA issued a 972 page investigative 
report that lay bare the lawlessness that occurred within Massey, the Justice 
Department announced that it was entering a non prosecution agreement with the 
new owners of Massey and therefore would not bring criminal charges against the 
company.”). 
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C. Charging the Corporation and Lower-Level Supervisors 
The need for corporate prosecution may be even greater in cases 
where only lower-level supervisors can be charged with wrongdoing. 
In cases where the only individuals who can be charged are at low 
levels within the corporate hierarchy, the weight of criminal 
prosecution falls on individuals who, while culpable, had no control 
over the corporate policies that led to criminal activity. The Gulf oil 
spill provides a classic example. There is widespread agreement that 
the Gulf oil spill involved a failure of corporate culture of epic 
proportions. BP had a corporate culture that promoted risk-taking in 
its drilling operations, at the expense of environmental protection and 
worker safety; the corporate policies and priorities that fostered that 
culture were determined to be the root cause of the spill.179 Yet the 
only individuals who had enough personal involvement in the spill to 
be charged with crimes — the well site leaders who were the top 
“company men” on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig — had no role 
in the development of BP’s policies or its corporate culture.180 
I have questioned whether the BP well site leaders should have been 
charged criminally in the Gulf oil spill, which effectively made the 
statement that they personally were responsible for thirteen deaths 
and catastrophic environmental harm in an oil spill caused by 
corporate failure far beyond their control.181 Perhaps there was 
sufficient evidence of the culpability of the well site leaders to justify 
criminal charges against them. Indeed, the government alleged in the 
superseding indictment that the defendants “negligently and grossly 
 
 179 NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, 
DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 122 26 
(2011), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO
OILCOMMISSION.pdf. 
 180 See Christina Bergmann, Oil Giant BP Faces Record Fine, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Nov. 17, 
2012), http://www.dw.de/oil giant bp faces record fine/a 16386244 (“‘This was a corporate 
culture run amok.’ . . . ‘There were issues with this well for weeks and months prior to the 
blowout. . . . You obviously can’t blame all of that on the rig supervisors.’”); Tom Fowler & 
Russell Gold, Engineers Deny Charges in BP Spill, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 18, 2012), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323622904578127173280594296 (“It 
raises the question if it’s fair to charge these individuals who had no influence or authority 
over these policies and this culture.”); Ameet Sachdev, BP Criminal Liability Influenced by 
1985 Chicago Case, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 18, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012 11
18/business/ct biz 1118 corporate mal 20121118 1 deepwater horizon workplace
safety gary leviton/2 (“‘Every study, even the government’s own investigations, have 
concluded that the spill occurred because of corporate management failures’ . . . . ‘It’s a fair 
question whether there are individuals higher up in the corporate chain of command who 
were involved in decisions that led to the spill.’”).  
 181 See Fowler & Gold, supra note 180. 
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negligently failed to maintain control of the Macondo well.”182 Or the 
defendants may have been scapegoats in a case where the government 
was determined to find individual culpability for the worst 
environmental disaster in United States history. 
In December 2015, the Justice Department dropped the remaining 
manslaughter charges against the BP well site leaders, leaving only a 
charge of negligent violation of the Clean Water Act.183 One of the 
well site leaders, Donald Vidrine, pleaded guilty to the Clean Water 
Act charge, which is a misdemeanor, and is awaiting sentencing.184 
The other well site leader, Robert Kaluza, was acquitted at trial in 
February 2016.185 But even if the government had successfully 
prosecuted both of the well site leaders, it would have been wrong to 
hold only those two individuals criminally responsible for the spill and 
the deaths that resulted. The government properly charged BP — as 
well as Transocean, the drilling company — with criminal violations 
of the Clean Water Act for their corporate negligence.186 To proceed 
otherwise would have indulged the counter-factual that only two 
relatively low-level supervisors were responsible for the spill despite 
abundant evidence of corporate failings in which they had no part. 
These were corporate crimes; prosecutors properly charged BP and 
Transocean.187 
 
 182 Superseding Indictment at 6, United States v. Kaluza, No. 12 265 (Nov. 14, 
2012). 
 183 Margaret Cronin Fisk & Laurel Brubaker Calkins, BP Well Site Managers’ Oil Spill 
Manslaughter Case Dropped, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2015 12 02/bp well site leaders win dismissal of u s manslaughter case. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Aruna Viswanatha, US Bid to Prosecute BP Staff in Gulf Oil Spill Falls Flat, WALL 
ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u s bid to prosecute bp staff in
gulf oil spill falls flat 1456532116.  
 186 Summary of Criminal Prosecutions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/criminal prosecution/index.cfm?action=3&prosecution  
summary id=2468 (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) (describing the criminal proceedings brought 
against BP Exploration and Production and Transocean, and their subsequent guilty pleas). 
 187 A different scenario might be presented if criminal activity occurred despite the 
best efforts of the corporation to comply with the law. If the corporation had an 
exemplary compliance program and individuals engaged in wrongdoing despite the 
fact that the company conducted its affairs in a manner that we would consider 
normatively desirable, it might be appropriate to prosecute only the culpable 
individuals. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 145, § 9 28.500 (“[I]t may not be 
appropriate to impose liability upon a corporation, particularly one with a robust 
compliance program in place, under a strict respondeat superior theory for the single 
isolated act of a rogue employee.”) In my experience, however, the existence of such 
“rogue employees” is usually attributable to shortcomings in the company’s training, 
supervision, or compliance programs, despite fervent claims to the contrary from 
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D. Charging the Corporation and No Individuals 
The need for corporate prosecution may be greatest in the most 
criticized — and most misunderstood — cases: prosecutions where no 
individuals are charged. Some of the concerns about corporate-only 
prosecutions are valid. Prosecutors should not pursue corporate-only 
prosecutions in exchange for not prosecuting individuals,188 which is a 
misuse of prosecutorial discretion and creates the appearance that 
corporations can buy-off charges against corporate officials. Nor 
should prosecutors resolve cases with corporate-only prosecutions 
because they are unwilling to invest the time and effort required to 
prosecute individuals. Likewise, prosecutors should not bring 
corporate-only charges based on weak evidence that corporations 
might not contest because of the difficulty of defending corporate 
cases or to avoid the scrutiny of a trial. 
In my experience, however, most corporate-only prosecutions occur 
because, while individuals could be charged, prosecution of those 
individuals is not appropriate as a matter of prosecutorial discretion. 
As a threshold matter, prosecutors only should consider criminal 
charges if there is sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and if they are confident that they can address any 
legal issues and defenses that may be raised by the defendant.189 But 
the decision to charge does not end with an evaluation of the evidence 
and possible defenses. Prosecutors also must consider principles of 
fairness and justice to ensure that charges are reserved for the conduct 
and defendants that are culpable.190 
In the regulatory crime context, significant violations could occur at 
a company where the only individuals with sufficient knowledge to be 
 
defense counsel. 
 188 See Yates Memo, supra note 160, at 5 (“Absent extraordinary circumstances, no 
corporate resolution will provide protection from criminal or civil liability for any 
individuals.”). But see Garrett, Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, supra note 159, at 
1791 (finding that, between 2001 and 2014, charges were brought against individuals 
in only 34% of deferred and non prosecution agreements).  
 189 See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 145, § 9 27.220 (advising a prosecutor 
to initiate charges only if “the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain 
and sustain a conviction”); David M. Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion and 
Environmental Crime, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 159, 164 (2014) [hereinafter 
Prosecutorial Discretion] (arguing that “prosecutors should only bring charges if there 
is sufficient evidence to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt”). 
 190 Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 189, at 215 (“Prosecutors thus 
have reserved criminal prosecution for culpable conduct and avoided charges based 
on technical violations or when defendants acted in good faith.”). 
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charged criminally are low-level employees — not even supervisors — 
who never received sufficient training or the resources necessary to 
comply with the law. Their supervisors, who might make better targets 
based on their higher status within the company, may have had no 
better training and no more resources. Yet higher up the corporate 
ladder, where responsibility for poor training and inadequate 
resources resides, management officials may not have enough 
knowledge to be charged with crimes. In those cases, where crimes 
occurred and there is a need for accountability, condemnation, and 
societal catharsis, it may not be fair or just to charge the employees or 
even their immediate supervisors.191 Instead, charges should be 
brought against the corporation that did not provide the training or 
the resources that its employees needed to meet the company’s legal 
obligations. 
Other corporate-only prosecutions occur because it is not possible 
to prosecute individuals. As the First Circuit recognized in Bank of 
New England,192 there are cases where corporate crime occurs but it is 
not possible to develop sufficient evidence against individuals to 
charge them with wrongdoing. Corporations compartmentalize 
knowledge and subdivide operational duties to promote corporate 
efficiency.193 In cases like Bank of New England where the corporate 
structure makes it impossible to charge individuals, there still is a 
societal need to address the wrongdoing. In those cases, the only 
potential defendant is the corporation.194 Prosecutors must choose 
between prosecuting the offending corporation and refusing to bring 
criminal charges despite clear evidence of corporate wrongdoing. 
In two of the McWane prosecutions, Tyler Pipe and Union Foundry, 
there was a similar problem with charging individuals. At both Tyler 
Pipe and Union Foundry, a worker died because of willful violations 
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSH Act”).195 But the 
OSH Act only allows criminal charges to be brought against the 
employer, which in both cases was the McWane subsidiary where the 
 
 191 Lynch, supra note 49, at 52 (stating that a corporate prosecution is appropriate 
“where the individuals who can be punished are insufficiently important to bear the 
weight of stigma appropriately attaching to the harmfulness or offensiveness of the 
wrong”). 
 192 United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 193 See id. at 856 (“Since the Bank had the compartmentalized structure common to 
all large corporations, the court’s collective knowledge instruction was not only 
proper but necessary.”). 
 194 Lynch, supra note 49, at 52 (stating that a corporate prosecution is appropriate 
“when no individual can be proven culpable”). 
 195 29 U.S.C. § 666 (2012). 
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deaths occurred.196 The Justice Department faced a choice: either 
prosecute Tyler Pipe and Union Foundry for the worker deaths or no 
criminal charges would be brought. Absent criminal prosecution, 
Tyler Pipe and Union Foundry would have faced only modest 
administrative fines under the OSH Act.197 The Justice Department 
therefore prosecuted McWane and obtained a $4.25 million criminal 
penalty in the Tyler Pipe case and a $3.5 million criminal penalty in 
the Union Foundry case, in addition to far-reaching compliance 
agreements for improvements at both facilities.198 
I would suggest that corporate-only prosecutions like those 
involving Tyler Pipe and Union Foundry may provide the best 
examples of why criminal prosecution of corporations is so essential. 
Both cases involved tragic worker deaths at facilities that had years of 
worker safety violations. The conduct was egregious enough to 
deserve criminal sanction, and prior fines had not convinced the 
companies to comply with the law.199 Corporations exist for lawful 
purposes only, not to engage in the rampant misconduct that took 
place at McWane’s plants. 
As I explained in Part I, there are retributive and utilitarian 
justifications for corporate criminal prosecution, particularly in cases 
like Tyler Pipe and Union Foundry. But the expressive function of 
criminal prosecution is highlighted most by the Tyler Pipe and Union 
Foundry cases. Criminal prosecution of Tyler Pipe and Union 
Foundry upheld the rule of law at facilities where it was under siege 
and made clear that companies are expected to provide a safe work 
place for their employees. Criminal prosecution also ensured societal 
condemnation of conduct at McWane that was reprehensible. 
McWane needed to be held accountable for a deplorable corporate 
culture — “the McWane Way” — that allowed worker safety and 
environmental violations at multiple McWane facilities, in Alabama, 
New Jersey, Texas, and Utah.200 
 
 196 Id. 
 197 Under the OSH Act, the maximum administrative penalty for willful or repeated 
violations is $70,000 per violation. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2012). 
 198 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Division of McWane, Inc. Sentenced to 
$4.25 Million in Criminal Fines & Community Service Related to Worker Safety, 
Environmental Crime (Sept. 7, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ 
opa/pr/2005/September/05 enrd 458.html. 
 199 Barstow & Bergman, supra note 170 (“The company has been cited for more 
than 400 safety violations and 450 environmental violations since 1995. While the 
company has paid roughly $10 million in fines and penalties, no McWane official has 
ever gone to jail for these violations.”).  
 200 See Two Companies, supra note 171 (describing the “McWane Way”). 
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Without criminal charges against the corporate defendants in Tyler 
Pipe and Union Foundry, the worker deaths that occurred at the 
McWane facilities would not have been crimes at all. There would 
have been no accountability, no justice for the families of the victims, 
and no opportunity for catharsis of any kind. Anything less than 
criminal prosecution of the McWane facilities would have expressed 
the wrong societal values: that worker deaths, even when they occur 
because of willful violations of the law, are just a cost of doing 
business; that the most egregious safety violations do not warrant 
societal condemnation; and that the suffering of McWane’s victims 
were just a matter for monetary penalties and tort claims. For the 
families of those victims and for the communities where McWane was 
a prominent company operating outside the law, justice required the 
strongest possible condemnation of McWane and admissions by the 
company that it had committed crimes. The collective sense that 
justice was served in Alabama and Texas — and in the other states 
where McWane routinely broke the law — was an essential ingredient 
for the affected communities to heal and face the future more 
confident that corporate lawlessness would not be tolerated. 
CONCLUSION 
Although most companies take their legal obligations seriously and 
contribute in positive ways to their communities, corporate crime 
occurs with alarming regularity. When corporations engage in 
criminal activity, their misconduct must be addressed by the criminal 
justice system. Corporate crime harms our economy, our workers, and 
the environment. Corporate crime has moral content, insofar as 
corporations have internal decision structures that allow them to act 
intentionally and therefore morally. Corporations have cultures that 
influence the conduct of individual corporate officials and a separate 
identity that may be deserving of punishment. From a utilitarian 
perspective, criminal prosecution is a stronger deterrent for corporate 
misconduct than civil enforcement and more likely to change the 
corporate cultures that foster criminal behavior. 
Corporate crime warrants the condemnation that the criminal law 
provides. The prosecution of corporations and culpable individuals 
within offending companies is necessary to uphold the rule of law, 
validate the choices of law-abiding companies, and provide 
accountability. Together those values contribute to our sense that 
justice has been done when crime occurs, which enhances trust in the 
legal system, provides the opportunity for societal catharsis that is 
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essential to healing, and allows us to move forward in the aftermath of 
criminal activity. 
We must hold corporations accountable even when individual 
defendants cannot be prosecuted — indeed, especially when 
individuals cannot be prosecuted — lest we send the message that 
corporations are above the law. When corporations face no 
consequences for their criminal behavior, cynicism increases about the 
role of corporations in our society. When corporations engage in 
misconduct that is criminal, we must be prepared to make clear that 
their conduct is criminal and uphold the core societal values expressed 
by the criminal law. 
